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Introduction
My dissertation essays use an economic approach to examine three socio-economic
contexts where externalities arise from human behavior. In my work on child adop-
tion, I show that the increasing trend of international adoptions in the United States
has substituted for large number of adoptions from domestic foster care, leading to
unintended societal outcomes: prolonged stay in foster care resulting in higher school
dropouts, drug use, teen motherhood and juvenile delinquency. In the paper on ef-
fects of pre-marital testing, I posit that uncertainty about future marriage partners’
health status may reduce incentives for disease prevention efforts prior to marriage,
resulting in higher rates of disease transmission, like HIV. In the third paper, ensu-
ing from a model of reciprocal externalities, I show that free riding results in dirty
neighborhood drains, aggravating the health externalities due to open defecation in
developing countries.
I broadly summarize each of my three dissertation essays below.
“More than kin and less than kind? The Economics of Child Adop-
tions from U.S. Foster Care”
My first dissertation chapter examines the economics of child adoption
from foster care. Over 500,000 children in United States are currently in foster
care, and in excess of 100,000 children among them are waiting to be adopted out
of foster care. Studies have shown that children in foster care tend to have much
worse long-run outcomes, including higher rates of unemployment, criminal activity,
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and incarceration (Doyle, 2007 & 2008). Thus having those children adopted out of
foster care reduces these externalities. While the rates of adoption from foster care
are low, there has been a spurt in international adoptions and births from Artificial
Reproductive Technology (ART). A few recent studies have shown that adoption
rates from foster care are highly responsive to adoption subsidies (Buckles, 2011;
Doyle and Peters, 2007). Gumus and Lee (2011) analyze the effect of child adoption
on the utilization of ART in the US, and find that a 10% increase in adoptions result
in a 1.3% - 1.5% decrease in the number of ART cycles performed. Little attention
has been paid so far to simultaneous patterns of substitutability among adoptions
from different sources (foster, domestic private and international) and ART births.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first paper to empirically evaluate substi-
tution effects among international adoptions, ART births and adoptions from U.S.
domestic foster care. To do this, we combine a detailed child-level data on chil-
dren in U.S. foster care for the period 1998 - 2009 with data on other adoptions
and ART births to empirically estimate the margins of displacement. We borrow
an instrumental variables strategy developed by Card (2001) and widely used in
the immigration and labor literature (Ottaviano et. al. 2013; Hong and Mclaren,
2015). We construct the“supply-push” instrument for the context of immigrant
children based on historical patterns of adoption from individual source countries
into specific states to identify these substitution effects. We estimate a reduction of
about 85,000 adoptions from domestic foster care due to the 230,000 international
adoptions, in the last decade. On the other hand, we find no effect of ART births
on adoptions from foster care. The large displacement effects casts doubt on the
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desirability of tax rebates and, calls attention to the consequent externalities on
unemployment and criminal activity.
“Betrothal Testing, Beliefs and Behavior : Effect of Testing Rules on
HIV Transmission”
In this paper we posit that uncertainty about prospective marriage part-
ners’ health reduces the incentives for prevention of diseases from individuals, lead-
ing to lowered aggregate efforts and higher disease transmission rates. Individuals
in countries with the HIV/AIDS epidemic are exposed to infection if married to
an infected spouse (Bongaarts, 2007). Recently several countries (China, India
among many others) have instituted premarital testing laws. Such a law man-
dates disclosure of information about infection status of prospective marital part-
ners to each other. Boozer and Philipson (2000) estimate the behavioral responses to
information-intervention of a HIV public testing program and find that although the
aggregate effects of the testing program is small, the effects on disaggregated private
beliefs are consistent with information elastic behavior for the average individual.
My paper analyzes the case of mandated pre-marital testing in contrast to public
testing. I use a simple two-period expected utility model to introduce a missing
aspect in understanding HIV transmission: the deterrence effect of future informa-
tion symmetry on current risky sexual behavior, and the motivating effect on safe
behaviors. A key insight from the model is that certainty in the infection status of
future partners affects current sexual behavior. I examine the effects of compulsory
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pre-marital HIV testing on rational choice of effort in prevention of STD’s prior to
and inside marriage and show that under certain conditions voluntary testing will
result in lower level of testing compared to mandated testing. I outline effects on
social stigma, sorting in marriage, timing of marriage and preference for marriage.
Some of the effects predicted in the paper are in line with the empirical evidence
shown in related recent papers. Robles (2011) finds a moderate increase in adult
syphilis rates and a significant increase in congenital syphilis rates where states re-
pealed their premarital blood testing requirements (BTRs), and argues that cost
benefit analysis effect on social welfare suggests that savings from averted premar-
ital blood tests may not have justified the costs of the health consequences from
repealing BTRs. Buckles et. al. (2011) find that BTRs are associated with a 6.1
percent decrease in marriage licenses issued by a state.
“Neighbors Can Make You Sick : Health Externalities of Dirty Drains
and Open Defecation”
In a co-authored work, we provide evidence that drain quality is a cru-
cial mechanism through which open defecation impacts human health. Economists
have recently begun studying the effects of community hygiene and sanitation such
as open defecation. Hammers and Spears (2013) use a randomized controlled ex-
periment to estimate the effects of a village-level community sanitation program on
child health. They find that the program caused a large average increase in child
height. Cameron et. al. (2014) use a randomized experimental design in rural
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East Java to evaluate a sanitation intervention consisting of information (to trigger
disgust at open defecation) rather than financial assistance. They find that the pro-
gram significantly increased toilet construction, effected behavioral change amongst
households with no private toilets, and had significant impacts on child health. Rel-
evant to the context of our study, they find that toilet construction is however more
effective at reducing open defecation than behavioral change but was hindered by
the lack of financial assistance. Our paper examines the health externalities of hy-
giene arising from a complementary network good, drains in the village. We find
that the quality of drains have large and significant impact on the incidence of water
borne disease. We find that poor quality drains combined with high levels of open
defecation, expectedly multiply the health impacts. Incorporating features from
models of agricultural household and reciprocal externalities, we present a simple
model showing how the choices of one household affects ill-health incidences of other
households. We use primary data of 1,530 households in rural Uttarakhand, India,
and find strong and systematic evidence that quality of drains affect the frequency
of water-borne diseases. We perform falsification tests and robustness checks with a
variety of controls, and obtain a consistent effect: clean drains reduce water-borne
disease incidence by 60 - 70% compared to the reference group (dirty drains). The
result suggests that improving the drainage system in conjunction with improving
toilet access is crucial for reducing water-borne diseases in developing countries.
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Chapter 1: More than kin and less than kind? The Economics of
Child Adoption from US Foster Care
1.1 Introduction
The age-old social institution of child adoption has been an accepted means of
family formation across the world and particularly in the United States1. With over
130,000 children adopted annually, U.S. leads the list of countries on the number of
child adoptions (United Nations 2010). An estimated 87% of cumulative adoptions
in the U.S. are children born in the U.S., primarily children from domestic foster
care. Such adoptions have been providing permanent homes for children in foster
care, improving their long run outcomes. Nevertheless, at any point of time in the
last decade about 500,000 children are in the U.S. foster care system2. Although
foster care is meant to be a temporary arrangement for many children, with roughly
1The phenomena of families adopting a biologically related or unrelated child possibly goes far
back in human civilization with biblical references to the story of Moses adopted by the Pharoah,
and widespread in Indian mythology with Lord Krishna and war-hero Karna being adopted by
unrelated parents.
2A study by Barth et. al. (2006) using longitudinal adoption subsidy and foster care placement
data estimated that the relative fiscal costs of foster care is twice as much as an adoption subsidy
for a statistically matched group of children.
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60% returning home, the average child stay is over two years (Doyle 2007). More
so, in excess of 100,000 children will continue to remain indefinitely3 in foster care,
switching many foster homes every year, unless they are adopted.
Studies have shown that children in foster care tend to have much worse long-
run outcomes. For instance, nearly 20 percent of the U.S. prison population under
the age of 30 report spending part of their youth in foster care (Burt et al. 1999)4.
Doyle (2007) identifies causal effects of foster care on long-term outcomes - including
higher rates of juvenile delinquency, teen motherhood, and unemployment among
children in Illinois. In a related study Doyle (2008) identifies higher rates of adult
crime and incarceration later in life for children who spent time in foster care.
Other studies across the country supplement these findings by showing higher rate
of drug use and sexually transmitted diseases for children who have been in foster
care (Jonson-Reid and Barth 2000; Courtney, Terao, and Bost 2004). The negative
welfare implications of children waiting to be adopted from foster care therefore is
substantive.
In this paper, we focus on the unintended outcomes due to changes in the
family formation landscape in the United States that might affect adoptions from
foster care [see Fig 1]. We call attention to the remarkable increase in international
adoptions and births from fertility treatments over the last two decades. Both these
options are alternative means of family formation outside of adoptions from foster
care. About 20,000 international children were adopted annually into the U.S. in
3Indefinitely, until they age-out of foster care at age 18 in most states in the U.S.
4An estimated 28 percent of U.S. homeless population has spent time in foster care as a youth.
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the last decade, while the rate of adoptions from domestic foster care continues to be
low, with less than a quarter of the waiting children in foster care adopted annually.
A natural question then arises: Do international adoptions reduce adoptions from
domestic foster care?
Figure 1.1: International adoptions, ART Births and adoptions from foster care
Improvement in fertility technology may be driving another trend: a rising
number of child births from Artificial Reproductive Technology (ART)5. In 2008, as
seen in Fig.1, more than 60,000 children (about 5% of total births in some states)
were born due to ART. Evidence from other studies suggests that increasing effec-
tiveness and availability of ART may be reversing the fertility problems reported
to be affecting millions of women in the United States (Bitler and Schmidt 2007;
Schmidt 2006). Descriptive evidence in Moriguchi (2012) suggests a negative corre-
lation between ART births and adoption rates. In the past, infertile couples wanting
to have children have sought child adoption, leading to a second question: Are the
increasing ART births reducing the rate of adoption from domestic foster care?
This paper aims to provide an answer to these two questions. To the best
of our knowledge, we are the first to estimate the causal effects of international
5According to Center for Disease Control (CDC), ART procedures involve surgically removing
eggs from a woman’s ovaries, combining them with sperm in the laboratory, and returning them to
the woman’s body. ART has been used in the United States since 1981, most commonly through
the transfer of fertilized human eggs into a woman’s uterus.
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adoptions and ART births on adoptions from domestic foster care. We develop this
argument in three steps. First, we present facts about attributes and costs of adop-
tion from different channels that suggest an hierarchical ordering, in the distribution
of attributes and costs across channels. Consistent with these facts, we conceptual-
ize a model of aggregate demand for all types of adoption, in addition to demand
for biological children via ART. We argue that the joint investigation of household
choices with all available options for child acquisition improves our understanding
of the impact of the two simultaneous trends: increase in international adoptions
and ART births in the U.S. We bring the theoretical predictions to examine a com-
prehensive data on adoptions and ART births that we compiled for this study. We
use the detailed child-level data on the population of children in foster care between
1998 and 2009, along with an unique dataset on international children adopted from
each of the individual source countries during this period. We identify the effects
by a novel application of an instrumental variables approach widely used in the
labor and immigration literature (Card and DiNardo 2000; Card 2001; Ottaviano
et. al. 2013). We exploit the variation of international adoption rates across the
states in the U.S. and the historical pattern in adoption enclaves, where adoption of
children from specific international countries are concentrated in particular states.
We adopt a similar approach for instrumenting ART births, and use alternative in-
struments for the endogenous regressors as robustness checks. We find that surging
international adoptions have displaced a large number of adoptions from domestic
foster care, and on the other hand, increasing ART births do not significantly affect
adoptions from domestic foster care. These results are in line with our theoretical
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predictions, and intuitively stem from strength of preference for own child for those
choosing ART, and the costs and probability of adoption from different sources.
In the next two sections we provide the background with a discussion of related
literature on child adoption and the U.S. foster care. While discussing data in
Section II, we present descriptive statistics and facts that is consistent with a story of
substitution, that we outline in the theory. Section III presents a short discussion of
the theoretical model consistent with those facts, deriving predictions to be brought
under econometric scrutiny. Following which we present the empirical framework
and econometric evidence on the predictions. Section V concludes.
1.2 Background and Related Literature
Adopting a child as an alternative to bearing a child is a widely accepted
means of family formation in many societies (Moriguchi, 2012). In the United States,
according to the 2000 census about 1.6 million have been adopted, which is about
2.5% of all children in the country. In the last decade the annual average adoptions
from other countries were about 20,000 children, and about 50,000 children were
adopted from the state managed foster care system per year in the last decade.
Despite the importance of adoption the topic has not received much attention in
the economics literature until recently6. Moriguchi (2012) presents an economic
6I exclude the contribution of Schultz and Becker on the topics of human capital and family
formation, as it does not relate directly to child adoption. Economists have shied away from the
topic for 30 years since Landes and Posner (1978) proposed a “market price for children” that
amends the shortage of children relinquished for domestic adoption and the abundance of children
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analysis of historical trends in the United States, for the period between 1950 and
2010, outlining the demand-side, supply-side and institutional factors underlying
the observed historical patterns. The paper schematically divides child adoption
in the U.S. into three categories: domestic private adoption, international adoption
and foster care adoption and notes the changing composition with the increase in
international adoptions.
As adoption typically entails a permanent change of family for a child, either
a transfer across households, or from foster care, it has a long run effect on the lives
of the child and families involved on both sides. In addition it has large welfare
implications for society at large. Doyle (2008) uses the randomization of families to
child protection investigators to estimate causal effects of foster care on adult crime.
Children on the margin of placement are found to be two to three times more
likely to enter the criminal justice system as adults if they were placed in foster
care. In another study, Doyle (2007) uses a similar dataset from Illinois, where
rotational assignment process effectively randomizes families to investigators. He
exploits the variation in placement tendency of these child protection investigators
as an instrumental variable to identify the causal effects of foster care on long-
term outcomes - including higher rates of juvenile delinquency, teen motherhood,
and employment among children in Illinois. The results suggest that children on
the margin of placement tend to have better outcomes when they remain at home,
especially older children. These results indicate the adverse effects of being in foster
care for children, even while compared to the alternative, being subject to varying
in foster care.
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degree of neglect or abuse in their family. Estimates show that the main reasons
children enter foster care are physical abuse (18.8%), emotional abuse (7.9%), sexual
abuse (6.2%) and caretaker inability (3.2%) (DHS 2007). Other factors for placing
children in foster care include, drug or alcohol abusive parents, abandonment and
parental incarceration or death. Clearly, all this evidence point that children on the
margin of placement have severe impediments for a normal childhood if in foster
care.
Figure 1.2: Children in U.S. Foster Care
The fact that over 800,000 children enter U.S. foster care every year and on
average stay two years in foster care, illustrates the magnitude of the problem [See
Fig 2]. Since the passing of a key federal act in 1997, there has been a steady decline
in the number of children in foster care due to a bevy of state legislations targeted
at reducing the length of foster care stay. As Fig 2 indicates the reduction in the
number of children staying in foster care for more than 5 years has been largely
outweighed by the increasing proportion of children staying between 1 to 2 years
– resulting in the average length hovering around 2 years. About 20% of children
in foster care whose parental rights have been terminated, will continue to stay in
foster care until they “age out” at eighteen, unless they are adopted7.
7Although there are no causal studies in economics identifying the effects of adoption compared
to staying in foster care, a rich literature in psychology evidences benefits of adoption on IQ and
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A variety of factors affect adoption rates of children waiting to be adopted out
of foster care. Several recent studies show that adoption rates are highly responsive
to adoption subsidies (Hansen and Hansen 2006). Since child welfare is largely gov-
erned by state statutes, outcomes vary across states in response to their policies.
Buckles (2011) exploits state-level variation in the minimum age at which children
are eligible for federal subsidy funds and finds over a 11% increase in adoptions with
the subsidy eligibility8. To put our paper in context, we speak to the question of
prolonged stay in foster care by examining variation in relative costs of international
adoptions and fertility treatments reducing likelihood of adoption from foster care.
We exploit the variation in relative costs of adoption at the state-level arising from
heterogeneity in state policies. Additional source of variation in costs are driven by
differences in costs and access to international adoptions stemming from historical
links. Our assumption about adoption costs dependent on age and other health
attributes of children is informed among other evidence, patterns in the data. The
assumption is reinforced by Skidmore et. al. (2014), who use a sample survey of
Michigan adoptive families that links adoptive parent characteristics, child charac-
teristics, and adoption-related expenses and subsidies. They estimate hedonic-model
other cognitive measures of the adopted child (see meta-analysis by van Ijzendoorn (2005)). On a
related note, in the economics literature, Sacerdote (2007) contributes to the nature and nurture
argument, by using a dataset on Korean American adoptees who were quasi randomly assigned
to adoptive families. He finds large positive effects on adoptees education, income and health
advancing the argument in the role for nurture.
8Between 2000 to 2006, 86.8 percent of children adopted through child welfare services received
a subsidy, with the average amount being $571.95 per month (Buckles 2011).
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type regressions to show that most of the variation in adoption costs is explained by
child characteristics. Moriguchi (2012) notes that the estimated monetary costs of
adopting a healthy infant through domestic private agency can range from $5,000 -
$40,000 and that the average waiting time is between 2 to 4 years. The average cost
of international adoption ranges between $15,000 - $30,000 and the expected waiting
time is comparatively lower, between 10 months to 2 years, depending on the coun-
try. The monetary costs of adoption from foster care are lowest, ranging from $0 -
$2500 due the adoption subsidies. The waiting time is relatively shorter, given the
large number of children waiting to be adopted in foster care. This schema for clas-
sifying adoptions and corresponding ordering of costs are relevant to our approach
in this paper, which we present in Section II.
A key aspect of adoption is the process of matching, where prospective adoptive
parents may be seeking particular attributes in the child they seek to adopt. Baccara
et. al. (2012) estimate the preferences of potential adoptive parents over U.S. born
and unborn children relinquished for adoption by their birth mothers. They use a
micro-level data of an U.S. private adoption agency to identify significant preferences
favoring girls and new born children, and against African American children. They
also point out that unmatched children in the private adoption “market” usually
enter foster care. This suggests that supply of children in domestic foster care is
in turn affected by number of unmatched children in the private adoption market.
Since a child if matched in the private market will not enter domestic foster care, and
only unmatched children would enter foster care, it suggests that private adoptions
are unaffected by matching process in foster care.
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Pagliero and Tetenov (2012) estimate the effect of various characteristics of
Italian couples on their demand for adopted and biological children. They examine
the extent of substitution between having a biological child and adopting an unre-
lated child. Their identification comes from exogeneity of couples fecundity status
as they assume that infecund couples have the same distribution of preferences,
but face a smaller choice set than fecund couples. Moriguchi (2012) through de-
scriptive evidence in her historical analysis suggests possible substitution effects of
ART births on child adoption. Gumus and Lee (2012) analyze the effects of child
adoption on the utilization of assisted reproductive technology (ART) in the United
States. Using state-level longitudinal data for 1999 - 2006, they estimate that a
10% increase in adoptions leads to a 1.3% - 1.5% decrease in the number of ART
cycles performed. The responsiveness is higher for infant adoptions, adoptions by
older women, and international adoptions, while there is no substitutability between
ART and adoption of related children.
While a spate of the recent studies have contributed to understanding the effec-
tiveness of adoption incentives, the extensive margin of substitution among adoption
sources and other options of having a child are still unclear. Our paper contributes
to closing this gap by jointly examining adoption alternatives, in addition to ART,
and identifying the substitution effects among international adoptions, ART births
and adoptions from domestic foster care.
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1.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
In this section we begin the discussion with some broad facts on attributes of
adopted children. Together with simple statistical evidence, these facts support the
story of variation in the average quality of attributes among the adoption sources
that informs our empirical predictions. In particular, data show that internationally
adopted children on average are younger and healthier than the children adopted
from domestic foster care [see Table 1]. The matching between birth mothers and
prospective couples on private adoptions happens before child birth and adoptions
are finalized immediately or soon after the child is born. Since the match can
occur early in the pregnancy, prospective adopters can provide for healthcare of
the birthmother and the child in-utero. On the other hand, compared to a new
born or yet to be born child adoption, there will be more uncertainty about the
health history of older children adopted either from foster care or from international
sources. Children adopted through private agencies or independently (through direct
contact of prospective adopters with birth mothers) are younger and healthier on
average, compared to international adoptions and, domestic adoptions from foster
care. Since ART births are all newborns they are naturally younger than any of
the adoption possibilities. These facts suggest that the relatively younger age of
private or independent adoptions make them a close substitution category to ART
births, and that international adoptions may be a close substitution category for
adoptions from domestic foster care as the children are often at least a few months
old. Correspondingly these facts also indicate that ART births are less likely to
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substitute away adoptions from domestic foster care in comparison to international
adoptions.
Table 1.1: Difference in attributes across adoption sources (% of total)
Variable Foster care International Private domestic
Age distribution at adoption
Age less than 1 2 50 >90
Age 1 to 4 10 30 0
Age 4 to 8 70 20 0
Child has special health care needs
Children ages (0-5) 39 10 25
Children ages (6-11) 59 33 35
Child diagnosed with ADD/ADHD 38 17 19
Child behavior problems 25 7 11
Source: Adoption Factbook V (2012)
As summarized in the table 1 and observed in our data, it is evident that on
average annually, the age of children adopted from international sources is lower
than the children adopted children from domestic foster care. Almost 50% of the
children adopted from international sources are less than one year old compared to
only 2% of all adoptions from domestic foster care. Our detailed child level data in
foster care lets us construct supply of children for adoptions by each age cohort of
children in foster care. The youngest cohort, infants (age less than one) in foster
care are smaller in size (about 100,000 on average in our dataset), compared to
older cohorts (who roughly range from 200,000 - 250,000 for each cohort up to age
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eight as seen in Tables 9 and 10). As we do not have individual level data on
international adoptions, we only observe proportions of total adoptions that belong
to age categories: less than one, age one to four, age five to eight, eight and above.
Also note [Table 1] the lower proportion of special care needs (disability, behav-
ioral problems) children adopted from international sources compared to domestic
adoptions, particularly children adopted from domestic foster care. Our child level
data on children in foster care includes detailed information about health history,
including disability and behavioral problems, some of which are summarized in Ta-
ble 4 [Summary statistics]. Unfortunately, we do not observe the health attributes
of children adopted internationally or from domestic private sources in our data for
a more detailed comparison.
We also emphasize that the data on costs of adoption from each of the sources
is limited. As evidenced by Skidmore et. al. (2014) and indicated by other reports
[see Table 2] adoption costs are correlated with attributes such as age and health
of the child. As seen in the distribution of costs in Table 2, adopting a child from
foster care costs is considerably lower than adopting internationally or from domestic
private agency. Because child welfare in the U.S. is a matter of family law it is
largely governed by state legislation. This variation in costs of adoption across
the states allows, under certain conditions, to identify whether the relative costs of
international adoptions affect the number of adoptions from domestic foster care as
we discuss in our empirical framework.
The tables on attributes [Table 2] of children from various sources of adoption
indicate a specific pattern in the distribution of attributes in children available for
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Table 1.2: Distribution of adoption costs by type (and major countries)
Description < 1k 1-5k 5-10k 10-20k 20-30k 30-40k 40-50k > 50k
Domestic
U.S. Private agency 0 1 1 23 33 25 13 4
U.S. Independent 0 4 13 24 14 25 14 6
U.S. Foster care 69 18 7 6 0 0 0 0
International (primary)
China 0 0 0 1 39 42 16 2
S. Korea 0 0 0 0 18 68 9 5
Source: Adoptive Families magazine, (Sample survey of 1100 adoptive families in 2012-2013)
adoption from the three sources of adoption (foster care, international and domestic
private). The literature and simple statistical evidence [Table 2] indicate an ap-
proximate ordering on the costs of adoptions, with domestic foster adoption on the
lower cost end. We now discuss the data and present some descriptive statistics,
which reinforces the previous discussion about variation in the average attributes of
adopted children and informs the theoretical model.
1.3.1 Children in Foster Care
The core of our data, on the population of children entering the foster care
system at the individual child level comes from Adoption and Foster Care Analysis
and Reporting System (AFCARS). AFCARS is a federally mandated data collection
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system recording individual or case level information on all children in foster care.
Dramatic improvements in data quality and completeness occurred between 1995
and 1998, since financial penalties were levied for poor quality data (AFCARS,
2000). In our analysis we estimate the results for children under age eight in foster
care, even though data are available for all children in foster care, up to a maximum
of age eighteen. We do this as the bulk of adoptions (about 90%) from foster care
comprise of children under age eight. There is a steep fall in rate of adoptions above
the age eight.
Data on child demographics [Table 4 and Fig 3] include gender, race, birth
date, health and other information on child attributes for the years 1998 to 20049.
Figure 1.3: Demography in Foster Care
1.3.2 Immigrant Adoptions
The data on children adopted by citizens of United States from other countries
was provided by the Department of Homeland Security for the years 1998 to 2008.
9We restricted ourselves to the data until 2004 as AFCARS noted errors in the data compilation
from 2005 to 2009. Additionally we prefer to estimate prior to 2004 as there may be changes in
the composition of demand for international adoptions from 2005. China accounted for almost
40% of the international adoptions in the U.S. and starting 2005 placed restrictions on prospective
adopters, including limiting it only heterosexual couples with minimum two years of marriage,
body mass index of less than 40 and not using a list of drugs.
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Table 1.3: Summary statistics: State year variables (1998 - 2004)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
International adoptions 388.73 366.94 357
Private/Independent adoptions 1136.54 1248.11 245
Foster adoptions (≤ age 4) 319.80 473.69 336
ART births 500.01 640.38 330
International adoption rate + 0.016 0.008 357
ART births rate 0.019 0.025 330
Private adoption rate 0.069 0.037 245
International adopt (male) rate 0.005 0.003 357
International adopt(female) rate 0.011 0.005 357
College educated % 25.95 5.231 350
Per capita personal income 28848.15 4982.70 350
+ All rates are calculated as numbers divided by the fertile population in the state multiplied by 1000
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Table 1.4: Summary statistics: Child level attributes in foster care
(Age less than 2, 1998 - 2004)
Variable Mean Min. Max. N
Adopted 0.055 0 1 267984
Male 0.508 0 1 267724
White 0.526 0 1 267984
Asian 0.014 0 1 267984
Black/African American 0.368 0 1 267984
Physically abused 0.166 0 1 250791
Sexually abused 0.019 0 1 250784
Neglected 0.588 0 1 250788
Drug abusive parent 0.262 0 1 250745
Disabled child 0.036 0 1 246252
Behavioral problem 0.013 0 1 250755
Parents died 0.003 0 1 246233
Parents in jail 0.059 0 1 246233
Abandoned 0.046 0 1 250665
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The data contained information on “immigrant orphans” adopted by US citizens
in each state by gender and age category [less than age one, 1 - 4, 4 - 8, 8 and
above]. A detailed data set for immigrant orphans adopted by state of residence in
the United States and the country of origin was used to construct the instrumental
variable along with initial distribution of these international adoptions in the U.S.
1.3.3 Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) births data
Data on Assisted Reproductive Technology was obtained from CDC. The ag-
gregate numbers for states on IVF (In Vitro Fertilization) cycles and live births from
IVF for each state was compiled from fertility clinic level data for the states. The
data used is for the years 1998 to 2008. The data is by type, number, and outcome
of ART cycles performed, number of live births and number of infants born in U.S.
fertility clinics.
1.3.4 Independent/Private adoptions data
We call attention to the measurement errors rife in the data on private adop-
tions which is recognized widely by experts on adoptions statistics (Flango 2007).
The issue stems from the fact that private agencies are not mandated to report their
managed adoptions. We have to rely on backing out data on private adoptions from
petitions filed in the state courts by adopting parents to validate the adoption pro-
cess. National Center for State Courts (NCSC) compiles adoption data from data
reported annually by these state courts [only 35 state courts have reported these
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numbers]. These are estimates due to several reasons as most states do not catego-
rize adoptions by type. Courts count all adoption petitions brought to them, and
include adoptions through public agency, private agency, individually arranged, and
even inter country adoptions. NCSC staff have used the court data in combination
with other sources, such as state bureaus of vital records, to develop estimates of
the total number of adoptions (Flango 2007; Flango and Shuman 2013).
1.3.5 Socioeconomic data
Data on per capita personal income for each state is from Bureau of Economic
Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. Data on educational attainment - per-
centage high school graduate and college or more of population 25 years and over,
is from the U.S. Census Bureau. Data on marriage and divorce rates were obtained
from the National Center for Health Statistics.
1.4 Theoretical framework
In this section, we outline a simple model of demand for children in U.S. house-
holds that informs our empirical estimation. Our assumption on the distribution of
attributes and the cost structure is consistent with descriptive evidence reported in
the previous section. With these assumptions we derive empirical predictions on the
substitution effects. Explicitly, the two key assumption are on ordering of average
“quality” (based on preferred attributes such as age, gender, race) of children and
average costs of adopting from each of the sources: foster care, international and
24
private adoption, in addition to ART. With these assumptions, we derive the pre-
diction that adjacent options will have higher elasticity of substitution. Therefore,
adoption from foster care can be expected to be more severely affected by lowered
costs and/or higher access to international adoption sources, than a change in costs
or access to ART.
We tie-up this theoretical prediction on substitution margins in the empirics
by exploiting the variation in relative costs and access to adoptions and ART across
states. We begin with a discussion of the attribute index (δ), and set up the choice
problem.
1.4.1 Basic set-up
Households can choose among three sources for adopting an unrelated child:
1) U.S. foster care, or adoption from a public agency
2) Domestic private adoptions, usually private agencies mediating between the birth
mother and prospective adoptive parents
3) International adoption, or adopting a child born and living outside the U.S.
In addition to these choices, we incorporate the increasingly viable fertility
treatments that couples, or single mothers could opt with varying costs and success
rates across the states. In our model, we include Artificial Reproductive Technol-
ogy that increase the likelihood of having a biological child, or the backstop, not
“acquiring” a child.
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1.4.1.1 δ: Index of child attributes
Children differ in their observable and unobservable attributes, such as gen-
der, race, age, health. For simplicity, we model these multi-dimensional attributes
as mapped onto an index of quality (δ ∈ [0, 1]). Descriptive evidence reported in
the section (Data and Descriptive Statistics) is consistent with reported estimates
suggesting that the average attributes varies across the three adoptions sources.
Prospective adopters matched with a birth mother independently or through a pri-
vate agency (domestic private adoptions) early enough in the pregnancy can influ-
ence the health of both the mother and child, in-utero. Usually, they complete the
adoption process of the new-born immediately after birth. Evidence suggests that
adopters prefer healthy infants. As shown in the descriptive statistics, over 80% of
the international adoptions in the period studied were children less than four years,
and half of them were infants. On the other hand, as we noted in the previous sec-
tion, children in foster care predominantly have a history of abuse and neglect, and
significant proportion have recorded health problems. Consequently, for prospective
adopters looking for young and healthy child for adoption, we note that expected
attribute match (E(δ)) from an international source or a domestic private adoption
would be on average higher than that from foster care. More on this in the following
subsection, where we explicitly state our assumption on relative costs.
Consider a population of potential demanders in state s, time t of size, Nst
10.
Each member of population obtains a net utility from alternate child acquisition op-
10We drop the index s and time dependence for ease of notation.
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tions: foster care (f); international child (i); domestic independent adoption through
private agency (p); Artificial Reproductive Technology improving the odds of con-
ceiving a biological child (b); no child acquired (o). The utility is a function of
attributes of the child δ and a vector of exogenous demand shifters Xst.
The prospective adoptive parent11 maximizes utility following:
Max{ΠfβγUf (δ,Xst)− Cf (δ), ΠiχUi(δ,Xst)− Ci(δ),
ΠpβχUp(δ,Xst)− Cp(δ), ΠbαUb − Cb, 0} (1.1)
1.4.1.2 Probability and costs
• Πb: The probability of conceiving a biological child is determined by an ex-
ogenous technology parameter; Cb: Cost of ART
• Πi: The probability of adopting an international child is determined in the
international market, and given that an U.S. adopter is only one among many
competing in the international market, so the probability is assumed exoge-
nous; Ci: Cost of adopting an international child
• Πp: For private domestic adoptions, the probability of success is determined in
the national market, and for simplicity we assume this probability is unaffected
by state-specific outcome, and every state is ‘small’ in the nation, so assume
exogenous; Cp: Cost of adopting a domestic child independently via private
agency
11If a household, we assume that the utility function for the couple or decision making members
of the household as equivalent here.
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• Πf (δ): Probability of adoption from foster care as a function of desired quality;
Cf : Cost of adopting a child from foster care.
The costs are driven by search costs and incurred while seeking adoption,
except foster adoption that is borne only if a child is adopted.
1.4.1.3 Dimensions of preference
• α ∈ [0, ᾱ]: Strength of preference for having a child
• β ∈ [0, 1]: Inverse preference for international child (vs. domestic child)
• χ ∈ [0, χ̄]: Preference for “quality” or higher δ
• η ∈ [0, 1]: Inverse preference for own biological child
The preference parameters are exogenous and drawn from a joint distribution:
α, β, χ, η ∼ g(α, β, χ, η)
1.4.1.4 Expected Utility
Utility from each option is represented by Uj(δ,Xst), where j ∈ {f, i, p, b, n}
and Xst is a vector of demand shifting variables, such as subsidy and tax rebate
available for each option. Without loss, set utility from no child acquisition as
Un = 0 for all.
For the moment, we simplify utility12, and write the utility function as follows:
12We simplify by assuming that the quality of child is highest (δ = 1) for all options except
foster care.
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• αUb: Utility from having an own biological child
• αUp: Utility from adopting a domestic child independently or privately (out-
side of foster care)
• αβUi: Utility of adopting an international child
• αUf (δ, χ): Utility if adopting a child from foster care and,
• αUf (δ̄, χ) = Uf , ∀χ where δ ∈ [δ, δ̄]






> 0 or strong preference for quality.
1.4.2 Assumption on marginal search costs
We assume the following order on the quality of attributes, consistent with
evidence presented in the previous section about the expected attribute match being
highest for an ART birth, followed by private adoption, international adoption and
adoption from foster care, respectively.
Ef (δ) ≤ Ei(δ) ≤ Ep(δ) ≤ Eb(δ) (1.2)
As described in the data, we find evidence for heterogeneity in relative costs
of adoption, stemming from variation in state funded subsidies for foster adoptions
and ease of access to international adoptions and private adoptions through local
private agencies. In light of this evidence, and in line with ordering of attributes
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(equation 2), we introduce the following assumption13 about marginal search costs










Following which we arrive at the number of households choosing each of the
options:
Uj = Argmaxj{ΠfβγUf (δ,Xst)− Cf (δ), ΠiχUi(δ,Xst)− Ci(δ),
ΠpβχUp(δ,Xst)− Cp(δ), ΠbαUb − Cb, 0} (1.4)
Proposition 1 With uniform preferences over α, β, χ, η and increasing marginal
search costs over quality of child χ yields an unique marginal foster adoption quality
δ̇ ∈ (δ, 1), such that Cf (δ̇) = Ci(δ̇), for all δ ∈ (δ, δ̇) such that Cf (δ̇) ≤ Ci(δ̇) and,
for all δ ∈ (δ̇, 1) such that Cf (δ̇) ≥ Ci(δ̇).
Proposition 2 With varying preferences, then the assumption (eq. 3) would
yield marginal δ that defines which category to adopt for the different classes are
described in the comparative statics.
The aggregate demand for each option will depend on the joint distribution of
13This assumption lets us derive predictions on the extent of substitutability among the options
but our empirical estimation does not hinge on it. The empirical results are consistent with
predictions on margins stemming for this, albeit strong assumption.
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[Uj(δ,Xst)− Cj(δ)]f(α, β, γ) dαdβdγ
=⇒ Πf (δ)×Nf = Aggregate demand for foster children (1.5)
1.4.3 Comparative statics and model predictions
Essentially our model categorizes three classes of households given their strength
of preference for own child: 1) strong preference for biological child, so unlikely to
adopt 2) Will adopt or high likelihood of adoption, rather than have biological child
(older women with lower probability of ART success or cannot afford ART treat-
ments) 3) all options are imperfect substitutes
• For those with strong preference for biological child, one qualified prediction
would be, little or no substitution between ART births (biological children)
and adoption from foster care (determining the proportion of people in this
class is an empirical question)
• For the two classes where all adoption sources are imperfect substitutes, a
second qualified prediction would be strong substitution between adjacent
categories (ART and private adoption are stronger substitutes than ART and
adoption from domestic foster care); international adoption and adoption from
foster care are adjacent categories and predictably have strong substitution ef-
fects if costs are lowered or availability or access improves.
• Increase in the probability of international adoption (higher access) or reduc-
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tion in costs would imply a reduction in adoption from foster care (marginal
child in foster care needs a higher δ to be adopted as the marginal utility from
international adoptions in equilibrium is higher)
Elasticity
Our empirical model calculates the substitution effect of international adop-
tions and ART births on adoptions from foster care. Since we proxy for costs of
adoption and undergoing ART, we can interpret our estimate as an elasticity. The





1.5 Empirical Strategy and Econometric Results
We now take the predictions from the previous section to our empirical data.
We first focus on the two key predictions 1) direct substitution between interna-
tional adoptions and domestic foster adoptions, in other words, the proportion of
international adoptions displacing adoptions from foster care, and 2) predicted lower
substitution effect of ART births on domestic foster adoptions. The two key theo-
retical predictions intuitively stem from the ordering on costs of adoption and the
average attributes of children available among the sources of adoption. As noted in
the descriptive statistics [Table 1], children in foster care are qualitatively different
since a large proportion have history of neglect or abuse (74% of infants and toddlers
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in our data) and suffer from physical or mental disability, compared to international
adoptions and private adoptions. If households in states where fertility treatments
are a viable option are primarily interested in a young and healthy child, they are
more likely to hire a private agency and consider a domestic private adoption or an
international adoption. Another crucial factor, as outlined in the theory is the cost
structure that naturally orders the adoption options, thereby distancing the choices
of an average household interested in fertility treatments (comparatively higher in-
come) from an average household choosing to adopt from foster care (the lowest cost
option). The similarity of attributes makes international adoptions and adoptions
from foster care adjacent options, making the substitution effect sensitive to cost
differentials between these two sources of adoption.
1.5.1 Variation in costs of adoption and fertility treatments
Our empirical implementation relies on the heterogeneity of adoption costs
across states for each type of adoption, and similar variability in the cost of un-
dergoing fertility treatments. As child adoption is legally mandated by policies
instituted at the state level economic incentives, such as adoption subsidies vary
widely across states (Buckles, 2011; Hansen and Hansen, 2006; Doyle and Peters,
2007). The variation in economic incentives translates into differences in relative
costs of adoption from foster care (public agencies) compared to domestic private
adoptions or international adoptions (private agencies). Another source of variation
in relative costs of adoption is accessibility of international adoptions. Since we do
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not have actual cost estimates by state, we begin our empirical examination by using
direct measures of rates of adoption from international sources and domestic inde-
pendent sources (private adoption) over time as explanatory variables that affect
the adoptions from domestic foster care. The assumption underlying the estimation
is that the variation in costs, once we control for state and year effects, are the main
source of variation in rates of international and domestic private adoptions. In that
case, an OLS regression would identify the effect of levels/rates of other adoptions
and ART births on adoptions from foster care. We recognize this indeed is a strong
assumption, so in the next section, we instrument the endogenous regressors with
variables that proxy their accessibility, both costs and availability.
We present the first specification, that under strong assumptions identifies the
substitution effect of international adoption, domestic private adoptions and ART
births on adoption from foster care.
Adoptedi,s,t =β0 + β1International rates,t + β2Private adopt rates,t + β3ARTs,t+
β4Child attributesi,s,t + β5Other Controlss,t + τs + τt + εi,s,t (1.7)
The dependent variable is whether the individual child (i) was adopted from
foster care, in state (s) and year (t). In the specification (Eq. 7), we control for indi-
vidual child level attributes with data on age, gender, race, history of health, abuse
and neglect, disability and behavioral problems, and status of parents (whether in
jail, and/or have died). Besides child level attributes, we include additional con-
trols. We include the size of the children in the cohort (number of children of the
same age) as a control for supply. We control for market level attributes of the
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available children by including the means of the attributes of children in the cohort
(for instance, percentage of each race in the cohort). Both supply of children in
the cohort and the average attributes of available children are controlling for the
composition of supply, which is key in matching markets. The number of adoptions
(or probability of match between adoptive parents and adopted child) depends on
the attributes of both the adult population and the population of children waiting
to be adopted (Hansen 2007). We partly control for the adoptive parents attributes
with socio-economic variables on per capita personal income (pcpi) and percentage
college educated in the state.
All specifications include state and year fixed effects and the standard errors
are two-way clustered by state and year.
Firstly we would like to draw your attention to the pattern of the coefficients
seen both in the point estimates in Table 5 (corresponding marginal effects in Table
6). For both infants (children under age one) and toddlers (children between age
one but less than two). Note that the marginal effects [Table 6] reduce when you
sequentially drop substitution categories (column 1 to column 3 for infants; column
4 to column 6 for toddlers). This is in line with predictions from econometric theory
when relevant variables are omitted from a model. This pattern of diminished
negative effect is consistent with our expectation as briefly outlined in the Appendix
A.5.
In the Appendix.1 we present the linear probability model as a robustness
check, and provides for easier interpretation of coefficients. We note that the linear
regression model has qualitatively the same results, but the estimates are consis-
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Table 1.5: Effect of Substitutes on Adoptions from Foster Care
Dependent Variable: Chid Adopted in foster care = 1
Age 0 Age 1
Probit (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
International adopt, rate -8.543** -8.344** -6.734** -3.008** -2.176 -1.903
(-5.09) (-3.49) (-3.09) (-3.52) (-1.59) (-1.48)
ART births, rate -0.874 -1.220 -0.566 -0.415
(-0.94) (-0.94) (-1.09) (-0.49)
Dom. private adopt, rate -1.701** -1.262**
(-8.05) (-9.71)
Additional Controls
Means(Child attributes) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual child attributes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State & year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Clusters 160 255 278 160 255 278
Observations 43803 104591 107018 94438 219325 224319
t statistics in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
The units of observations are at the individual child level in foster care.
Standard errors are clustered by state and year
Other controls are % college educated, PCPI, size of children available for adoption in state
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Table 1.6: Effect of Substitutes: Probit Marginal effects
Dependent Variable: Chid Adopted in foster care = 1
Age 0 Age 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
International adopt, rate -0.3270** -0.2964** -0.2435** -0.3011** -.2257 -0.1973
Marg. elasticity -22.94** -22.19** -17.86** -6.442** -4.555 -3.984
ART births, rate -0.0334 -0.0433 -0.0566 -0.0431
Marg. elasticity -2.34 -3.2437 -1.212 -0.8694
Dom. private adopt, rate -0.0651** -0.1264**
Marg. elasticity -4.569 -2.730**
No. of Clusters 160 255 278 160 255 278
Observations 43803 104591 107018 94438 219325 224319
t statistics in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
The units of observations are at the individual child level in foster care.
All regressions include state and year fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered by state and year
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tently higher than the Probit marginal effects. The marginal effects [Table 6] show
similar pattern of sign and significance. We examine possible sources of endogeneity
that might bias our estimates and contend with measurement issues in the data on
private adoptions.
1.5.2 Endogeneity and data issues
In our shares specification above, the state fixed effects absorb any statewide
variables that might otherwise influence the level of demand in the local market.
Our identification relied on the assumption that variation in costs were the main
source of variation in international adoptions and domestic foster adoptions, after
controlling for state and year fixed effects.
To the extent that local demand shocks lead to an increase in demand for both
international and foster adoptions, the specified shares model will result in biased
estimates. The difficulty in establishing a causal effect arises if other unobservable
factors are correlated with the error term. For instance, favorable demand condi-
tions in a state may stimulate both international adoptions and domestic adoptions,
leading to an upward bias in the partial correlation between international adoptions
and foster adoptions. This would mean the negative effect is actually of higher mag-
nitude than we estimate. In other words, we will be underestimating the negative
effect of international adoptions on domestic foster adoptions.
A more severe issue would be when the local demand shocks are alternative
specific. For example, consider the case where preference in the local population
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is shifting away from domestic foster adoptions in favor of international adoptions.
To illustrate, suppose potential adopters in California favor adopting children from
China or Korea rather than from domestic foster care. Our identification assumption
fails, if this preference shift occurred between 1998 to 2004 as the state fixed effect
would only capture any time-invariant variation in preferences of the states. For e.g.,
adopters in California always favor international child to domestic child compared
to adopters in Nebraska, who favor domestic child relative to international. On the
other hand, any time varying, alternative-specific local demand shocks, however,
remain in the error terms. This would bias the effect of international adoptions up
or down depending on the shifts in the specific local preferences.
Several other such concerns that threaten our internal validity may arise, since
our identification with shares regression rests on strong assumptions.
Data on private adoptions
An issue with our original shares regression is poor data on private adop-
tions. Mis-measurement on independent variables may lead to biased estimates, in
addition to other sources of bias, as sketched in the previous section. Experts on
child adoption statistics have widely noted that a major impediment in examining
adoption trends is lack of good data on private adoptions (Flango, 2011). Follow-
ing federal legislation mandating reporting of adoptions from foster care, accurate
and comprehensive data have been compiled for adoption from foster care man-
aged by state public agencies. The quality of data on adoptions we use from foster
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care (maintained by AFCARS), in addition to international adoptions (reported by
DHS) has been validated for accuracy. On the other hand, the data on domestic
private/independent adoptions (managed by private agencies, outside of foster care)
are unreliable. Despite the need for complete information on total adoptions, there
are no federal policies (or incentives) that necessitate private agencies to report in-
dependent adoptions managed by them. The National Center for Court Statistics
estimates total adoptions for most years using petitions by adoptive parents in state
courts to finalize the child adoption. Because all adoptions of U.S.-born children
and an unknown, but significant number of international adoptions are finalized
in U.S. courts, the courts are a key source of adoption data (Shuman and Flango,
2013). The NCSC estimates for each year are approximate as the adoption petition
year may not correspond to the actual adoption date. Courts grant most petitions,
but not all. Another source of noise is that some states have mandated petitions
(6 states in the study period) for all adoptions including international, but the ma-
jority have not14. But even in the states that have no mandated requirement for
14Adoptions by U.S. citizens completed in foreign countries also complicate the adoption count
(Flango, 2012). When U.S. citizens adopt a foreign-born child abroad, they must apply to the
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security for an
IR-3 visa – which classifies the child as an immigrant and provides the child with U.S. citizenship
upon arrival in the United States. Recognition and validation of adoption is subject to the laws
of the states in which the parents reside. Twenty-four states give full effect and recognition to
an adoption decree from the country that granted the adoption, which means that the foreign
adoption decree is considered as valid and binding as one issued by a state court (Child Welfare
Information Gateway, 2008). Twenty-four states offer re-adoption or validation as an option, but
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petitioning an international adoption, cautious adoptive parents may petition to be
on the safe side. It is evident from the above reasons that private adoptions data
are riddled with systematic and random error components.
In our previous estimations we use the total adoption data compiled by NCSC
(limited to only 25 states) to arrive at numbers for independent or private adoptions.
Econometric theory recognizes that measurement error on independent variables
results in biased and inconsistent estimates (Stock and Watson, 2004). Given the
gravity of the measurement issues, we conclude that it is a costly trade-off to use
the limited and noisy private adoptions data, rather than a balanced panel without
private adoptions. We briefly describe our strategy to overcome this data issue
below. Firstly, we identified the six states that have mandated that all adoptions
finalized in the state need to be petitioned in state courts. In these states, the data
on private adoptions can be distinguished from other adoptions. On the cleaned up
data in the subset of states, we check if the instruments for international adoptions
and ART births are correlated with the private adoptions data. In our case, the
“supply-push” instrumental variable on international adoptions were not correlated
with the data on private adoptions. On the other hand, the instruments continued
to be correlated with the endogenous regressors within the subset of states. We
not a requirement. Validation of the foreign adoption means submitting the foreign adoption
decree for state approval, and re-adoption is the process of adopting a child previously adopted in
another jurisdiction as a way to legitimize the foreign adoption and obtain a United States birth
certificate. Six states require adoptive parents to petition the court to validate or register the
foreign adoption, and so presumably in these states the court adoption figures are complete for all
adoption - - regardless if finalized in state or abroad.
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therefore argue that our instrumental variables specification can exclude private
adoption.
Such a supply-push instrument addresses concerns of endogeneity emanating
from both unobservable demand shocks as well as error-in-variables.
We report these checks on the instruments in the Appendix. To summarize,
we find our proposed instruments to be discussed in detail in the next section are
correlated with endogenous regressors and uncorrelated with private adoptions data.
This allows us to identify the effect of the key factors, the effect of international
adoptions and ART births on adoptions from foster care.
1.5.3 Instruments
1.5.3.1 Predicted supply instruments
The instrument we use to proxy cost-driven international adoptions further
extends the method proposed by Altonji and Card (1991) and Card (2001). It has
been used extensively in the immigration and labor literature since.15 We exploit the
fact that international adoptions from the different source countries, China, Russia,
Korea (to name a few, see Fig. 4) have varied in the U.S. according to the changes in
the accessibility from these countries and the domestic conditions that are specific
15Ottaviano et. al. (2013) in a recent paper analyzing the effect of immigration and offshoring
on American jobs use the same methodology to construct their instrument for immigrant labor.
They use their instrument to identify whether immigrant labor displaces native employment. In
this paper, we construct a similar instrument to identify the displacement effect of “immigrant
orphans” on native children in foster care
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to the country of origin. High initial presence or historical rates of adoption from
these specific source countries into particular states, for eg. South Korea into New
Jersey, make those states more susceptible to shifts in origin-specific cost and push
factors compared to states with lower initial presence.
Figure 1.4: Changing number of international adoptions, by source
Supported by evidence in the data, we assume that total number of interna-
tional adoptions from a given source country who enter the United States is inde-
pendent of country-specific demand conditions in any particular state in the U.S.
In other words, no disproportionately large adoptions into a state from a particular
source country. The actual inflow of immigrant orphans (to use the US Department
of State terminology for internationally adopted children) from a given source coun-
try (in the case of China, 3,953 incoming adopted children to U.S. in the year 1997)
moving to a destination U.S. state (the case of Florida, 126 children accounted for
3.2% of total incoming U.S. adoptions from China in the same year) can be decom-
posed into an exogenous supply-push component, based on total inflows from the
country and the fraction of earlier immigrants from that country who live in the
state, and a residual component reflecting any departures from the historical pat-
tern. Multiplying the total inflow from a given source country based on historical
variation in the U.S. states gives an estimate of the supply-push component of recent
immigrant inflows that can be used as an instrumental variable in the estimation of
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equation. Using these two facts we predict the international adoptions from each of
the key origin countries to each of the states in the year prior to our regression anal-
ysis, and we augment it with aggregate, U.S. level, annual international adoptions
from these specific countries. Then, we sum it across all the key source countries
for each of the states. This gives us the predicted rate of international adoptions.
Note that it varies across states over time, and highly correlated (95%) with our
endogenous regressor, actual international adoption rate.
Figure 1.5: Instrumental variables correlated with endogenous regressors
To implement our instrument, we group the source countries for international
adoptions. In the last decade alone, one hundred countries have been sources for
international adoptions in the U.S. For instance, in the year 1997, there were 102
countries of origin for international adoptions in the U.S, and countries ranged
from Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria to Uzbekistan, Venezuela and Vietnam. The
largest number of adoptions were from Russia (4,309 children, i.e., 29% of total),
China (3,953, 27% of total), followed by Korea (12% of total). There were scores of
countries, including Afghanistan, Albania and Uzbekistan that each sent less than
5 children to the U.S. in the year 1997. Therefore using all the source countries to
predict our instrumental variable would be erroneous, due to a high proportion of
0 initial proportion from those countries in several states. We retain each country
that constitutes more than 5% of the total incoming international adoptions as a
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separate category and club the rest of the country as the “other” category. For
the year 1997, this classification system constructs our instrumental variable with
China, Russia, Korea, Guatemala and the “Other” category (22% accounting for
the rest of the total international adoptions). We later do a robustness check with
two other instruments: (1) a 10% threshold for initial year that identifies countries
to arrive at predicted supply (10% predicted supply instrument), and (2) passports
issued as a measure of variation in internationalization across the U.S. states.
To formally construct the CARD “supply-push” instrument, we represent the




represent the fraction of immigrants from an earlier cohort of
immigrants from country ‘c’ who are observed living in state ‘s’ prior to 1998 (‘T’).




to 0.032. In the absence of demand-pull factors, the number of immigrants from







PCARD5s,t is independent of demand conditions in state ‘s’ over the 1998 -2004
period, then this estimate is independent of any demand-pull conditions in the city.
We use the same methodology to construct a predicted instrument for ART
live births. The initial share of ART births in 1997 for each state were multiplied
by the change in levels of ART live births at the U.S. national level. The initial
state shares proxy for the ease of access and provide the variation in the costs of
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ART live births across the states. We find that the instrument for ART live births
are highly correlated with actual numbers on ART live births (see Fig 5). We use
two other measures as a robustness check: (1) states that have mandated coverage
of fertility insurance (Fertility law16), which lowers the cost of fertility treatments
in the states, (2) IVF success rate (IVF success), number of IVF cycles resulting in
live births, capturing technology variation in fertility treatments across states.
1.5.3.2 Instrument exogeneity
As we noted the immigration and labor literature has resorted to using the
predicted supply instrument, since comprehensive data on immigration costs is un-
available. We face a similar challenge in the context of data on costs of adoption. We
argue that our instrument on international adoptions is even more defensible, com-
pared to the immigration setting. One objection in the context of labor immigration
would be that higher earnings and productivity in certain regions for particular skills
drove the original influx, and that region and skill-group-specific relationship may
16The first state-level infertility insurance mandate was enacted by West Virginia in 1977. Since
that time, 14 other states have passed mandates, and additional states have ongoing legislative
advocacy efforts in this area.The mandates vary along several dimensions. A mandate “to cover”
requires that health insurance companies provide coverage of infertility treatment as a benefit
included in every policy. A mandate “to offer” requires that health insurance companies make
available for purchase a policy which offers coverage of infertility treatment. In addition, some
mandates exclude coverage of in vitro fertilization (IVF), which is one of the most expensive
treatments available for infertility. Finally, some mandates cover all health plans, while others
either exclude health maintenance organizations (HMOs) or only cover HMOs. (Schmidt, 2007)
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continue to persist over the years. This leads to an endogeneity issue due to omit-
ted variables on measures of inherent productivity complementarities. In the child
adoption setting, such concerns are mitigated since incoming immigrant children
do not make the choice of emigrating as mostly the case with labor migration. In
addition, our instrument for international adoptions does not suffer from concerns
of reverse causality, where original immigrants may persuade friends and relatives
to emigrate into their region.
Our constructed instrument on international adoptions and ART births in
theory traces the supply curve, and therefore mitigates the endogeneity concerns we
have raised with the shares regression. We discuss the results in the next section.
1.5.4 Key Empirical Results
We present our key results using the method Two Stage Residual Inclusion
(2SRI) proposed by Terza et. al. (2008). The 2SRI estimation is similar to more
widely used 2SLS when using instrumental variables, except that in the second-
stage regression, the endogenous variables are not replaced by first-stage predictors.
Instead, first-stage residuals are included as additional regressors (see appendix
A.6). We prefer this estimation to conventional 2SLS, as our second stage has a
binary outcome (adopted out of foster care) as the dependent variable, rather than
a continuous variable. Terza et. al. show that 2SRI is consistent in a generic
framework, including non-linear second stage estimation, and 2SLS is not. In the
appendix we report the 2SLS estimates as a robustness check on estimation method,
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and the results are qualitatively similar. The coefficients from the 2SRI estimations
also closely resemble the comparable IV probit estimation for the single endogenous
regressor model (international adoptions).
In Table 7 and 8 below, we see the first stage estimations on the bottom panel
for both infants [Table 7] and toddler [Table 8]. The F statistics on the first stage
are over the thumb rule of 10. As reported in the Appendix 14, they exceed the
Stock and Yogo critical values for joint instrument relevance (for the conservative
10% maximal IV size).
Turning our attention to the key variables of interest, we find that the effect
of international adoptions are negative and statistically significant (1% significance
level). On the other hand, ART births, even with instrumenting, continue to be
statistically not significant. Note that these effects are in line with the theoretical
prediction of a direct displacement (substitution) between international adoptions
and adoptions from foster care, and lower degree of substitutability between a bio-
logical child (ART birth) and adopting from foster care. The sign and significance
are consistent across instruments (5% and 10% predicted supply for international
adoptions; and IVF Bartik and Fertility law for ART births). As ART births shows
no statistically significant effect on adoptions from foster care, we estimate a single
endogenous regressor model without ART births, reported in the last two columns
of Table 7 and 8. International adoptions persist with their negative effects on adop-
tions from foster care. We report the IV estimates for all age cohorts up to age 8 in
next section and interpret the marginal effects.
48
Table 1.7: Effect of International adoptions, ART on Foster Care (Infants)
Dependent Variable: Chid Adopted in foster care = 1
2 endog. regressor 1 endog. regressor
International adopt -48.16** -38.67** -49.31** -36.22** -50.31** -50.69**
(-7.13) (-3.87) (-6.03) (-2.65) (-6.38) (-5.22)
ART births 2.059 -2.944 2.104 -2.951
(0.83) (-0.73) (0.88) (-0.66)
Intl. residuals 43.95** 33.49** 44.14** 30.29* 42.80** 41.96**
(6.22) (3.18) (5.29) (2.14) (5.65) (4.62)
ART Residuals -3.152 4.540 -2.969 4.465
(-1.03) (1.00) (-0.97) (0.89)
First Stage
Instrument 1 5 pc 5 pc 10 pc 10 pc 5 pc 10 pc
Instrument 2 F. law Bartik F. Law Bartik
Intl. adopt IV 180.7** 164.7** 136.5** 129.1** 158.5** 119.8**
(3.82) (3.33) (3.03) (2.67) (3.52) (2.71)
ART IV 0.0849** 309.5** 0.0837** 290.3**
(4.60) (2.92) (4.73) (2.73)
Clusters 278 278 278 278 278 278
Observations 94263 94263 94263 94263 96425 96425
The units of observations are at the individual child level in foster care.
All regressions include state and year fixed effects and the standard errors are clustered by state and year49
Table 1.8: Effect of International adoptions, ART on Foster Care (Toddlers)
Dependent Variable: Chid Adopted in foster care = 1
2 endogenous regressors 1 endogenous regressor
International -27.91** -16.05+ -29.95** -15.73 -25.57** -28.39**
(-5.49) (-1.87) (-4.96) (-1.41) (-4.51) (-3.95)
ART births 1.002 -3.824 0.798 -3.854
(0.70) (-1.44) (0.55) (-1.31)
Intl. residuals 26.74** 14.58+ 28.54** 14.04 24.67** 26.14**
(5.14) (1.68) (4.69) (1.25) (4.17) (3.69)
ART residuals -1.010 5.379+ -0.648 5.375+
(-0.65) (1.94) (-0.40) (1.76)
First Stage
Instruments 5pc, FL 5pc, Bartik 10pc, FL 10pc, Bartik 5 pc 10 pc
Intl. adopt IV 159.5** 143.9** 124.7** 115.5* 143.3** 112.0*
(3.33) (2.84) (2.76) (2.34) (3.11) (2.51)
ART IV 0.0810** 274.2** 0.0802** 253.2*
(4.34) (2.67) (4.51) (2.46)
Clusters 278 278 278 278 278 278
Observations 197249 197249 197249 197249 201960 201960
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1.5.5 Extensions and robustness checks
As we noted earlier, about fifty percent of the total international adoptions
are children below age two. Almost eighty percent of the international adoptions
are constituted by children less than age 4. The rest of the 20% of international
adoptions are mostly children between ages 4 and 8. Therefore, as the model pre-
dicts, we expect a substitution effect for cohorts of higher ages, besides the infants
and toddlers. We expect ART live births (new-borns) to be further away as substi-
tute for higher cohorts, since the closest substitutes would be the youngest cohorts,
infants and toddlers. Since we did not find a significant effect of ART births on
infants/toddlers, we estimate the higher cohorts with only international adoptions
rate as an endogenous regressor. As reported in Table 9 (cohorts age 2 to 4) and Ta-
ble 10 (cohorts age 5 to 8), we continue to see a negative and statistically significant
effect of international adoptions on domestic foster adoptions in higher cohorts. We
present both 2SLS and IV Probit estimates in the appendix.
Gender and age effects
We calculate the cross-elasticity of substitution by breaking down the data by
gender and age.
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Table 1.9: Cohorts of age 2, 3 and 4
Dependent Variable: Chid Adopted in foster care = 1
Age 2 Age 2 Age 3 Age 3 Age 4 Age 4
2SLS IV Probit 2SLS IV Probit 2SLS IV Probit
Adopted
International adopt, rate -2.962** -20.61** -2.428* -14.14* -3.099* -18.335*
(-2.75) (-3.04) (-2.10) (-2.05) (-2.22) (-2.59)
First stage: Intl. rate
Intl. IV (5pc) 136.4** 138.7** 135.56**
(3.30) (3.58) (3.16)
F statistic 9.96
Observations 242692 242692 240831 240831 225411 225411
The units of observations are at the individual child level in foster care.
All regs. include state and year fixed effects and the s.e. clustered by state and year
52
Table 1.10: Ages 5, 6, 7, 8
Dependent Variable: Chid adopted in foster care = 1
Age 5 Age 5 Age 6 Age 6 Age 7 Age 7 Age 8 Age 8
2SLS IVP 2SLS IVP 2SLS IVP 2SLS IVP
Intern. a. rate -2.76** -17.59** -2.96** -19.41** -2.79** -19.75** -2.42* -18.49**
(-2.61) (-3.24) (-2.64) (-3.44) (-2.62) (-3.55) (-2.38) (-3.48)
First stage
Intl. IV (5pc) 0.154** 0.157** 0.158** 0.161**
(2.82) (2.89) (2.92) (3.01)
Observations 249176 249176 243018 243018 241777 241777 242359 242359
The units of observations are at the individual child level in foster care.
All regs. include state and year fixed effects and the s.e. clustered by state and year
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Table 1.11: Breakdown by gender
Dependent Variable: Chid adopted in foster care = 1
Age 0 Age 1
Male Female Male Female
Intl. male rate -9.73* -7.38 -2.53 -4.79+
(-2.32) (-1.50) (-0.95) (-1.68)
Intl. female rate -11.18** -9.57** -4.13* -3.80*
(-3.83) (-3.19) (-2.21) (-2.13)
Observations 49,590 49,590 45,765 45,765 101,838 101,838 100,016 100,016
The units of observations are at the individual child level in foster care.
All regs. include state and year fixed effects and the s.e. clustered by state and year
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1.5.6 Marginal effects
We estimate a reduction of approximately 10,000 adoptions for a 1 percent
increase [see Table 12] in the rate of international adoptions.
In our study period, the total international adoptions increased from 15,583
(in 1998) to peak at 22,991 (in 2004), an increase of about 47.50 percent. Given the
steady increase in the interim years this translates to roughly 5 percent annual in-
crease in international adoptions. With the assumption of constant marginal effects
on the 5 percent, we estimate a reduction of about 50,000 adoptions in the data
period that can be attributed to international adoptions.
In sum, the 135,918 international adoptions between 1998 to 2004 we estimate
has displaced about 50,000 domestic foster adoptions in the intervening years.
1.6 Potential issues and concerns
In this section we discuss potential issues with the approach in this paper and
elucidate our measures to address these concerns.
The principal concern has been about the perspective of examining substitu-
tion among adoption options and ART rather than a direct examination of causal
factors, such as change in costs leading to a change in the adoption outcomes. Such
a direct examination of causal mechanisms would indeed be key to understanding
the levers that affect adoption outcomes and lead to specific policy implications.
We point that our analysis makes a case for such ensuing studies on mechanisms
by showing evidence for strong displacement effect of international adoptions. Al-
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Table 1.12: Marginal effect of international adoptions
Foster Care M. eff. Int. r. ∆ Est. red.
Age No. Adp. Adp. % Prob. Mean pr. 1pc 5pc
0 129405 1993 0.02 -2.33 0.16 -0.0038 -24.43 -487 -2434
1 267984 14696 0.05 -2.53 0.16 -0.0041 -7.46 -1096 -5481
2 289039 32280 0.11 -2.96 0.16 -0.0048 -4.27 -1379 -6897
3 284620 37409 0.13 -2.43 0.16 -0.0039 -2.98 -1113 -5567
4 265458 35644 0.13 -3.10 0.16 -0.0050 -3.72 -1325 -6627
5 251879 28647 0.11 -2.76 0.16 -0.0044 -3.91 -1120 -5600
6 245795 25928 0.11 -2.97 0.16 -0.0048 -4.54 -1176 -5881
7 244682 23693 0.10 -2.98 0.16 -0.0048 -4.96 -1174 -5872
8 245187 22382 0.09 -2.42 0.16 -0.0039 -4.27 -956 -4780
Total 2,224,049 222,672 -9,828 -49,139
though our work does not directly link between cost changes and demand, we exploit
key aspects of “immigrant orphan” inflows17, particularly variation in attributes and
inflow rates across states that proxy for the underlying cost differential. In doing
that we argue that our instrument is uncorrelated with omitted variables. On the
other hand examining policy changes directly is often vexed with endogeneity issues
due to selection bias. In our approach, we sidestep these identification concerns
by using an exogenous supply side instrument and take a first cut at the issue of
domestic adoption from foster care displaced by international adoption. A second
concern is about use of the term “margins of substitution” among child acquisition
17We borrow the phrase “immigrant orphans” from the classification of a foreign born child
adopted by US citizens by the US Department of Homeland Security.
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options. We prefer the concept of displacement akin to the immigration literature,
where labor economists examine the effect of immigrants on native employment.
The displacement effect we estimate, i.e., every three international adoptions dis-
placing one domestic adoption from foster care are analogous to diversion ratio for
discrete goods in the regulatory literature, that capture cross-elasticity of demand.
The diversion ratio can be interpreted as measuring how much of the demand diverts
from good ‘F’ to good ‘I’ due to a relative price change, and can be calculated as
the product of the ratio of the cross-elasticity to the own-elasticity and the ratio of
the demand for product ‘I’ to the demand for product ‘F’.
We would like to point out that duration analysis may be appropriate for the
child adoption setting. Duration models are designed to estimate the length of time
before an event occurs – job lost, war breaks, individual is afflicted by a disease
episode, or as in the case of adoption, how long before the child gets adopted out of
foster care conditional on a variety of factors. In order to implement such duration
models we need to track the unit of observation over time. Since the individual
child-level data is encrypted for confidentiality and our own strategy to identify
these children18 was error-prone, we were unable to use duration models. Rather we
resorted to a conceptually similar model that estimates the conditional probability
of adoption with our cohort-level regressions (based on age). Our estimation method
allows us to estimate the effects more precisely as we are able to comprehensively
18We used time-invariant child-level attributes such as date of birth, race and date of first entry
in foster care to construct child level identifiers. Unfortunately we were only able to get a fuzzy
match with a significant percentage of children unable to be tracked
57
use the data on the population of children in foster care.
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1.7 Concluding remarks
With the large population of children waiting to be adopted at risk of experi-
encing negative life outcomes due to prolonged stay in foster care, it is imperative
to examine some of the causal factors adversely affecting their adoption outcomes.
In the analysis here, we outline a simple model of household choice to examine the
underlying substitution effects among child adoption options, in addition to births
from choice of fertility treatments. We take the prediction to data and estimate a
strong negative substitution effect of international adoptions on domestic adoptions
from U.S. foster care system. We borrow an instrumental variables approach widely
used in the labor literature to identify the effect of international adoptions and ART
births. Births due to fertility treatments do not have a statistically significant effect
on adoptions from foster care. Both these effects are consistent with prediction from
the model, arising from an ordering of preference among options. We estimate a
reduction (or delayed adoption) of approximately 10,000 adoptions for a 1 percent
increase in the rate of international adoptions. Between 1998 and 2004, international
adoptions increased steadily at about 5% annually. Our estimates suggest that the
5 percent increase in international adoptions has resulted in a reduction of about
50,000 adoptions from U.S. domestic foster care.
In sum, the 136,000 international adoptions has displaced about 50,000 do-
mestic foster adoptions in the intervening years of rising international adoptions.
Studies on psychological and other measures of well-being strongly suggest that
adoption is a favorable outcome for children in foster care. We note the identified
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effects of prolonged stay in foster care on individual outcomes, but also highlight
the large welfare implications on society due to increased rates of teen motherhood,
unemployment, criminal activity and incarceration19.
While interpreting these results, two main caveats should be kept in mind.
First, we estimate annual reduction in adoptions at the cohort level which amounts
to delay in adoption for at least one year. Since we are unable to track children over
time, we would be unable to identify if these children are adopted in later years.
Second, even though the instrumental variable estimations should ameliorate bias
from omitted variables, the exclusion of private adoptions may bias the estimates
downwards (as illustrated in the appendix and indicated in the shares estimation).
Therefore the IV estimates can be seen as a lower bound on the substitution effect.
Still, the large displacement effects of international adoptions indicate that
both the federal and state governments need to evaluate the policies that affect
adoption of children in foster care. Other studies find that adoption subsidies in-
centivize adoptions from foster care. The federal government needs to re-examine
its uniform tax rebate of up to 13,000$ for all types of adoptions which reduce the
relative cost of international adoptions. We emphasize that our paper is an attempt
to bring attention to the unintended consequences on foster outcomes and does not
indicate that international adoptions are unfavorable.
19A recent study calculates that the average annual cost on correctional facilities and incarcer-




Appendix A: Comparative table with numbers and rates of adoptions
Table A: Adoptions: Foster care (< age 4) and international
Year Adoption rate Number of children Adopted children Number of
from foster care in foster care from foster care International adopt.
1998 0.0651 152811 9949 15583
1999 0.0926 170007 15745 15719
2000 0.0847 173905 14743 18857
2001 0.0856 175933 15068 19647
2002 0.0917 179374 16450 21467
2003 0.0920 181819 16745 21654
2004 0.1003 186967 18754 22991
2005 0.1048 197347 20688 22734
2006 0.0981 207524 20373 20680
2007 0.0989 209852 20762 19608
2008 0.1081 204408 22106 17456
2009 0.1150 195022 22434 12744
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A.1: Shares specification with linear models
Table A.1 presents the linear regression corresponding to the specification
estimated in Table 13. Linear model estimates a slightly larger magnitude of substi-
tution effects compared to the probit estimation, but the qualitative results do not
change. The estimated coefficient on international adoption rate is negative (-0.551)
at the 1% level of significance (t statistic is -3.66) with inclusion of all substitutes
for infants. The effect is numbed down (-0.328), without the inclusion of other sub-
stitutes, and statistical significance is reduced to 10% level. A similar pattern holds
for toddlers, but now without the substitutes, international adoptions are no longer
significant predictors of adoptions from foster care. The pattern is consistent with
econometric theory when a relevant variable is omitted, in this case, a substitute
(See Appendix A.5).
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Table A.1: No endogenous reg. model: OLS estimation
Dependent Variable: Chid Adopted in foster care = 1
Age 0 Age 0 Age 0 Age 1 Age 1 Age 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
International adoption, rate -0.551** -0.380* -0.328* -0.411** -0.279+ -0.248
(-3.66) (-2.50) (-2.32) (-3.15) (-1.72) (-1.63)
ART births, rate -0.0597 -0.0448 -0.0779 -0.0379
(-1.10) (-0.76) (-1.27) (-0.40)
Dom. private adopt, rate -0.0921** -0.127**
(-4.18) (-4.27)
Observations 44033 104821 107248 94438 219325 224319
The units of observations are at the individual child level in foster care.
All regs. include state and year fixed effects and the s.e. clustered by state and year
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Table A.2.1: 2SLS regression for Infants in Foster Care
Dependent Variable: Chid Adopted in foster care = 1
Intl. adopt endog. Intl. adopt and ART births endog.
5 pc 10 pc 5 pc 5 pc 10 pc 10 pc
F. law ART F. Law ART
International adopt, rate -2.371** -2.289* -2.347** -2.214* -2.335** -2.144+
(-3.11) (-2.49) (-3.59) (-2.19) (-3.01) (-1.72)
ART births, rate 0.0424 -0.0227 0.0434 -0.0289
(0.28) (-0.06) (0.30) (-0.07)
First Stage
International adopt IV 158.5** 119.8** 192.82** 175.08** 147.27** 138.59**
(3.52) (2.71) (4.06) (3.51) (3.24) (2.83)
Fertility Law -0.0849** 0.0837**
(4.60) (4.73)
ART bartik 309.48** 290.32**
(2.92) (2.73)
F statistic
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 12.39 7.34 9.00 1.62 6.25 1.26
Observations 107248 107248 104821 104821 104821 104821
Stock Yogo CV: 10% IV size, 7.03; 15%, 4.58; 20%, 3.95; 25%, 3.63
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Table A.2.2: 2SLS regression for Toddlers in Foster Care
Dependent Variable: Chid Adopted in foster care = 1
Intl. adopt endog. Intl. adopt and ART births endog.
5 pc 10 pc 5 pc 5 pc 10 pc 10 pc
F. law ART F. Law ART
International adopt, rate -1.983** -1.985* -2.359** -1.535* -2.539** -1.427+
(-2.69) (-2.29) (-3.13) (-2.12) (-2.72) (-1.70)
ART births, rate 0.266 -0.290 0.257 -0.301
(1.63) (-0.93) (1.50) (-0.95)
First Stage
International adopt IV 143.3** 112.0* 171.34** 154.69** 134.742** 124.540*
(3.11) (2.51) (3.58) (3.03) (2.96) (2.49)
Fertility Law 0.081** 0.080**
(4.34) (4.51)
ART bartik 274.195** 253.169
(2.67) (2.46)
F statistic
Kleibergen-Paap F stat. 9.67 6.30 7.20 1.01 5.43 0.77
Observations 224319 224319 219325 219325 219325 219325
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Table A.3.1: Instruments orthogonal to data on private adoptions
Dependent Variable: Private adoptions in states with mandated petition for adoption
OLS 5 pc IV 10 pc IV
Intl. IV (5 pc pred.) 0.247 0.386 -1.145
(0.34) (0.46) (-0.75)
Intl. IV (10 pc pred.) -6.53e-09 -3.04e-08 -1.0e-07
(-0.04) (-0.11) (-0.50)
ART instrument (F. Law) -0.0001 -0.0001
(-1.43) (-1.16)
ART instrument (Bartik) -0.303 0.335
(-0.22) (0.18)
Constant -0.0162** -0.0160** -0.0163** -0.0159* -0.0157+ -0.0136+
(-5.70) (-5.28) (-5.23) (-2.89) (-2.68) (-2.16)
Number of Clusters 28 28 28 28 28 28
Observations 25039 25039 25039 25039 25039 25039
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Table A.3.2: Instruments correlated with international adoptions in the mandated
petition states only
Dependent Variable: International adoptions in states with mandated petition for adoption
OLS 5 pc IV 10 pc IV
Intl. IV (5 pc pred.) 356.3* 632.2* 328.9
(3.24) (3.92) (1.51)
Intl. IV (10 pc pred.) 0.00009** 0.0001** 0.00009**
(7.06) (7.47) (4.06)
ART instrument (F. Law) 0.0291+ 0.00859+
(2.37) (2.28)
ART instrument (Bartik) 62.35 -44.20
(0.22) (-0.22)
Number of Clusters 33 33 33 33 33 33
Observations 28430 28430 28430 28430 28430 28430
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Table A.4: Two endogenous reg: 2SRI estimation (Instruments: Intl. 5pc, IVF
success rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intl.r. ART r. Age 0 Intl. r. ART r. Age 1
International adoption, rate -49.65** -28.60**
(-6.31) (-4.79)
ART births, rate -4.607 -0.128
(-1.09) (-0.06)
Residuals (Intl.) 45.02** 27.08**
(5.41) (4.47)
Residuals (ART) 6.163 1.098
(1.30) (0.45)
First stage
Intl. IV (5pc pred. supply) 158.5** 143.3**
(3.52) (3.11)
ART IV (IVF success rate) 0.184** 0.192**
(3.48) (3.86)
Observations 96655 94493 94263 201960 197249 197249
The units of observations are at the individual child level in foster care.
Include state and year fixed effects; standard errors are clustered by state and year
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A.5: Omitted Variable Bias
We present a short note here on the issue of direction of bias with omitted
substitution categories. Following our simple model, we model all adoption cate-
gories (foster care, domestic private and international adoption) are imperfect sub-
stitutes20.
Adopt in Foster Care = β1Const.+β2 International adopt+β3 Dom. Priv. adopt+ε
If our identification assumptions hold, the estimates of the above specification
will yield the substitution effects of the various categories on adoption from foster
care. What are the consequences if we estimate this specification omitting the scarce
and noisy domestic private adoption data? In that case, we are left with the reduced
model below:
Adopt from Foster Care = β1aConstant+ β2a International adopt + ε















Cov(Intl. adopt, Intl. adopt)
V ar(Intl.Adopt)
β3






= β2 + β3
Cov(Intl. adopt, D. Priv. adopt)
V ar(Intl.Adopt)
(as other terms amount to zero)
(1.11)
We know that β3 < 0, since domestic private adoptions negatively affect adop-
tions from foster care. Since international adoption and domestic private adoption
are substitutues, we expect their covariance to be negative. Since variance is al-
ways non-negative (denominator), we can sign the bias from omitting international
adoptions as positive.
Essentially, our reduced equation underestimates (β2a) the effect of interna-
tional adoptions on domestic foster adoptions. This can be interpreted as lower
bound estimates. Our instrumental variables estimation we argue21 mitigates some
of this bias despite omission of the private adoptions category.
21As we showed in Section A.3 that our instruments are orthogonal to private adoptions in the
subset data, restricted to states with clean classification of private adoptions
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A.6: Two Stage Residual Inclusion
The first stage begins with the two population regressions (equation 6 and 7)
linking the endogenous regressors, (1) international adoptions, (2) ART live births,
and their respective instruments.
International ratei,s,t =α0 + α1Predicted supply (5pc)s,t + α2Controlss,t+ (1.12)
ART birth ratei,s,t =α0 + α1Predicted supply (IVF)s,t + α2Controlss,t+ (1.13)
The second stage we plug in the residuals.
Adoptedi,s,t =β0 + β1International rates,t + β2ARTs,t
+ βres1Residual 1s,t + βres2Residual 1s,t
β4Child attributesi,s,t + β5Other Controlss,t + τs + τt + εi,s,t (1.14)
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Chapter 2: Betrothal Testing, Beliefs and Behavior: Effect of testing
rules on HIV transmission
Two neighbors may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common;
because ’tis easy for them to know each others mind; and each must perceive,
that the immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is the abandoning
of the whole project. But ’tis very difficult and indeed impossible, that a
thousand persons shou’d agree in any such action; it being difficult for them
to concert so complicated a design, and still more difficult for them to execute
it; while each seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble and expense, and
wou’d lay the whole burden on others.
- David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Vol II (1739)1
2.1 Introduction
Marriages are widespread in the recorded history of human societies (West-
ermarck 1922). They can last a life-time2 and key to pscyhological, sexual and
1The epigraph is in the hope that David Hume will eloquently convey in a few lines
that the author attempts in the next few pages.
2Or atleast meant to be. Traditional marriage vows in most cultures signify this lasting nature
of marriage with phrases like ‘till death do us apart’ in Christian weddings or circumambulating
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overall well-being in adult life (Gove 1983, Oppenheimer1988). Given the centrality
of marriage in people’s lives, considerable efforts are exerted in choice of partners by
individuals. The laws and customs that regulate the marital institution varies across
countries and cultures. Like any institution, the social and legal institution of mar-
riage regulates the activity of its individual members within its purview. Economists
have noted that uncertainties in health and other attributes of future partners sig-
nificantly affect the outcomes in the marriage market (Becker 1973). In the last
two decades, the risk of HIV/AIDS 3 infection from a partner inside marriage has
appended to a host of other risks. For instance in India, a country with the second
largest number of HIV infected individuals, an estimated 90% of women living with
HIV acquired the virus from their husbands or long-term partner4 (Silverman 2008).
Recently, several governments across the world have stipulated mandatory testing
as a prerequisite for marriage5. A not-so-apparent consequence of such laws, if it
the fire according to Saptapadi rites in a Hindu marriage.
3Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is a disease caused by the Human Immunode-
ficiency Virus (HIV)
4It must be noted at the onset that empirical examination of people’s “private lives” is extremely
challenging and riddled with reporting and measurement errors. The source of errors in prevalence
statistics include: the ‘window period’ when testing does not detect infection (Corbitt 1999), non-
comparability between regions with low testing rates with regions with higher testing, selection
bias in voluntary testing and absence of testing. Bias in estimation of responses is to be expected
due to underreporting by people indulging in risky sexual behavior.
5 Local governments in India, China, Ethiopia; countries of Bahrain, Guinea, United Arab
Emirates, Saudi Arabia among many other have enacted laws and policies mandating premarital
testing
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increases testing is the reduced uncertainty in infection status of prospective marital
partners. In this paper, I examine the incentives at work in three different insti-
tutional regimes that affect pre-marital sexual behavior, which consequently affects
aggregate social welfare through preference for marriage, marriage timing, sorting,
HIV stigma and transmission of HIV. I bring attention to the effect of information
acquisition and transmission and the ensuing incentives in the three regimes which
characterizes systems across countries 1) no HIV testing 2) voluntary pre-marital
HIV testing of a prospective partner and 3) mandated pre-marital HIV testing of a
partner. I highlight the efforts chosen at prevention of disease during the pre-marital
period of sexual activity, sorting in marriage and its effect on incidence or new in-
fections under different regimes. In addition to showing that efforts at prevention
are higher in a mandated regime compared to “no testing regime”, the paper brings
attention to the interaction of cultural norms with fear of learning in the volun-
tary testing regime that may lead to an socially inferior outcome. The paper briefly
traces the trade-offs for the individual and for the social-planner within each regime.
The paper in part is about recognizing psychological costs (of resolving uncertainty)
and the prevailing structure of social interaction for optimal institutional design.
In the next section I outline the history of pre-marital testing legislation, fol-
lowed by a brief section on relevant literature. A simple expected utility model to
determine the equilibrium efforts at prevention and the resulting outcomes under
varying regimes follows. The discussion section introduces the idea, why volun-
tary testing may result in sub-optimal welfare compared to mandatory testing? I
conclude with a section on the trade-offs confronting the social planner.
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2.2 Background
2.2.1 Mandated testing: legal history
The judicial standpoint on mandatory testing across countries and within is
neither uniform nor clear-cut. In the United States, the state of Illinois introduced
mandatory HIV testing for acquiring marriage licenses in the late eighties. The
law stipulated that both parties to a proposed marriage inform each other of their
test results with effect from January 1, 1988. Marriages in the state plummeted
from 95,613 in 1987 to 78,302 in 1988. The Monthly Vital Statistics Report (1991)
records that, “the number of Illinois brides who married in other states, particularly
neighboring states, increased substantially, doubling and even more than tripling in
some states”. The state registered a drop of 22.5% in marriages in that period, 8 of
70,846 applicants for marriage licenses were found to be HIV positive and the total
cost of the testing program for 6 months was estimated at $2.5 million or $312,000
(in 1989 dollars) per HIV positive individual identified (Turnock 1989). Another
study estimated that mandatory premarital screening, if adopted nationally, would
cost $167,230,000 (Petersen 1990a). In neighboring Mexico, seven out of thirty two
states had pre-marital HIV testing mandated as early as 1994. A prevalence of 0.03%
was found in the regions and according to a study, “... premarital HIV testing is
not only violative of human rights but an expensive public health measure useless
in the control of the spread of HIV” (Del 1994). Although the monetary costs of
testing has fallen drastically, the drop in marriage rates in Illinois raises the issue of
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preference for mandated testing.
In the recent past, several state governments in India have passed mandatory
HIV testing laws before marriage and the national government is evaluating adopting
it countrywide (Malhotra 2008). Malaysia mandated a HIV screening test nationally
starting January 1, 2009; several Christian churches in Nigeria have required their
members to test before marriage since 2007; Roman Catholic churches in Burundi
require HIV testing to precede the wedding ceremonies from 2006. Several local gov-
ernments in countries including China have mandated compulsory testing laws for
prospective marital partners. Nevertheless legal opinion is highly divided, bringing
to fore concerns about human rights violation in the implementation of such laws. It
is evident that stipulating a mandatory testing is highly controversial and requires
scrutiny by social scientists besides legal scholars and human rights activists.
2.3 Related literature
The HIV epidemic has become the most feared and analyzed disease of the
last two decades with an over 34 million estimated infected in 2007UNAIDS2007.
New infections of HIV occur primarily through sexual activity between individuals
with different infection status (Dow 1996). Approximately ten percent of adults in
Sub-Saharan Africa are infected with HIV and the primary mode of transmission
in the region is heterosexual sex. Currently, the absence of cure for AIDS and the
high costs of treatment has led policy makers to focus on interventions preventing
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further spread6(Hogan 2005).
Increasingly, voluntary counseling and testing (VCT) has been widely advo-
cated intervention and used to increase awareness of HIV status and reduce risky
behavior in affected countries (Sweat 2000). Evaluation studies in many countries
have reported that reduction in risky behavior and transmission due to VCT inter-
vention is unclear (Glick 2005). A recent paper finds that minor monetary incentives
could increase testing rates by 50%, and that individuals on learning their HIV pos-
itive status are three times more likely to purchase condoms (Thornton 2008). Self
selection in opting for voluntary counseling and testing admittedly is a serious lim-
itation in evaluating its effects (Thornton 2008). Universal mandatory testing does
not suffer from such selection. Although a pre-marital testing law may have other
implications such as change in preference for marriage itself, which may reintroduce
bias.
The emphasis on HIV testing for prevention has underlying assumptions: first,
the positive effects of learning HIV will prevent the spread of the disease. In partic-
ular, it is implicitly assumed that those diagnosed negative will protect themselves
from infection and those diagnosed positive will take precautions to protect others.
Second, many believe that it is difficult to get people to learn their HIV status (due
to psychological or social barriers like stigmatization), thus justifying expenditures
on de-stigmatization and advertising campaigns (Thornton 2008).
6(Canning 2006) has written a comprehensive literature review of the recent literature on the
macroeconomic issues of HIV/AIDS. I restrict myself to studies examining behavioral responses
to incentives.
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As we mentioned in the previous section, several countries have attempted to
introduce, considering implementation or have already mandated testing. Besides a
couple of case studies in the public health literature on the Illinois experience (Cleary
1987,Turnock 1989) and cost-benefit analysis of mandatory syphilis testing in the
US (Haskell 1984), a careful examination of the economic implications of mandatory
testing is required. A related study by economists has been analyzing the impact of
public testing on HIV (Boozer 2000). Their paper estimates the behavioral responses
to the type of information-intervention a public HIV testing program would typify
using a demand for information model. Given the centrality of marriage, and the
high costs of HIV, there is a need to examine the implications of mandated pre-
marital testing. This paper examines the outcomes of mandatory testing laws,
focussing on HIV transmission, and compares it to the case of “voluntary testing”
and the base case “no testing”. Additionally, the paper underscores the differences
in institutional and psychic costs under the different regimes. The economic trade-
offs are recognized in the different regimes of testing which vary with culture and
structure of social interaction.
2.4 Theory
As outlined in the earlier section, legal institutions governing pre-marital test-
ing rules differ across countries. In this section, I use a simple model to capture
the incentive structure for individuals to prevent disease that are inherent in the
different regimes of testing. The model presented here ignores several complexities
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in the real-world in the hope of elucidating the key insights. Another idea which
I attempt to show is the interdependence between individual psychic costs of test-
ing and the institutional environment, which exacerbates the costs of testing. Here
again, the model allows us to easily recognize the interaction and thereby illumi-
nates the (possibly surprising) outcome of the regimes that hinge on the institutional
environment.
2.4.1 The expected utility model
Set up and assumptions:
Individuals live in two periods: One prior to marriage (period 1) and one inside
marriage (period 2).
Information/Beliefs7: Common priors with homogenous beliefs or ex-ante het-
erogenous priors [two types: previously careful (PC), previously not careful/reckless
(PR)] in period 0 (or before the start of period 1).
Efforts (e) are exerted to prevent infection in period 1 based on information
in period 0.
e ∈ [0, 1]
Personal probability of infection p(e) depends on own efforts (e), conditional
on the population infection rate, Π(ė|λ, β) = Π(ė). p′(e) < 0 ; p′′(e) = 0 (p(e) is
linear and decreasing in efforts).
7Beliefs, personal probability of infection and transition probabilities all belong to the
subjective-expected-utility world of Savage (1954). In addition, I assume that the subjective prob-
abilities overlap with objective probabilites in the aggregate.
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The population infection rate is a function of aggregate population efforts (ê)
determined by equilibrium individual efforts (e) and conditional on the infection
rate in period 0 (λ), and the virulence of disease (β), a biological parameter. For
simplicity, we assume β = 1. Efforts are costly (C(e))
C ′(e) > 0 ; C ′′(e) > 0
Utility measure representation8:
Uhh: Utility of of being uninfected oneself and marrying an uninfected partner
or a healthy-healthy match in marriage;
U ii: Utility of an infected-infected match in marriage;
Uhi: Utility of being healthy oneself and marrying an infected partner or a
healthy-infected match in marriage;
U ih: Utility of an infected-healthy match in marriage.
I assume that a discordant marriage (one infected, one healthy) is equal in
utility to an infected-infected marriage9.
U ih = Uhi = U ii = U I
and Uhh = UH
I assume that a healthy marriage is preferred to an infected marriage.
UH > U I
If an individual chooses to stay single, I assume being a healthy-single is pre-
8The assumptions have also been informed by previous studies. A 2007 Johns Hopkins study
in Ethiopia reports that 96% of the respondents would cancel the marriage if pre-marital test was
discordant and they tested healthy.
9This assumption can find some validity if infection is difficult to prevent inside marriage. So




Uh > U i
]
. Note that the health status in superscripts are
in capitals for married individuals.





, will choose efforts (e) to maximize his returns from period 2 (expected marital
health), given the prevailing infection rate (λ), costs of effort C(e). Higher efforts (e)
will lower his personal probability of infection10 in period 1, if he were uninfected in
period 0 but will be increasingly costly (C(e) is convex). The trade-off is increased
(expected) benefits from healthy marriage in period 2 (due to lowered probability of
infection in period 1), and cost of preventing disease in period 1. The institutional
environment (allowing, or in this case hindering information acquisition that affords
choice of partner and thereby health inside marriage) is reflected with expected
health in marriage determined by population infection transition probability (Π).
Max
e












U ih (1−Π(ê)) + UhiΠ(ê)
}
2.4.2 No Testing regime
2.4.2.1 Common priors
Pre-determined utility at period 0, Ū .
10High efforts in period 1 or the period of pre-marital sexual activity, for instance could be
















U ih (1−Π(ė)) + UhiΠ(ė)
}
First order condition:








U ih (1−Π(ė)) + U ihΠ(ė)
]}
= 0
which can be reduced to [See Appendix for details of derivation],
=⇒ C ′(e) = −δ(1− λ) (1−Π(ė)) p′(e)
(
UH − U I
)
(2.1)
the familiar Marginal cost = Marginal benefit equation. The optimal efforts
(
−
e) will be determined by equation 111.
−C′(e)
p′(e)
= δ(1− λ) (1− Π(ė))
(
UH − U I
)
Since we know that
(
UH − U I
)
> 0 ; 1 > (1−Π(ė)) > 0 ; (1− λ) > 0 and δ > 0, we
have a positive term on the right side in the above equation.
−C′(e)
p′(e)
≥ 0, as C(e) is convex and p(e) linear and decreasing in e. We arrive at
−
e≥ 0.
2.4.2.2 Ex-ante heterogenous priors
In the real-world, even with no testing availability it is likely people possess
varying levels of information about their previous efforts and hold subjective beliefs
of their infection status. Although continuity would generate a richer set of results,
for simplicity I assume two types of individuals (1) previously careful (PC), with
subjective probability12 (belief) of infection λpc (2) previously not careful/reckless
11The (Kakutani) fixed point theorem gives us the proof of existence of an equilibrium.
12 I assume that subjective probability overlap with actual probabilities
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(PR) with subjective probability of infection λpr.
λpr > λpc
The maximization problem for previously careful and previously not careful
involve identical expected utility models in their prior beliefs about infection [See




epr. As expected those previously careful will
have higher level of efforts compared to previously reckless in the period before
marriage (period 1).
2.4.2.3 A note on signalling equilibrium
If efforts were observable, under certain conditions (including single crossing
property of the utility functions of the two types), a signalling equilibrium can result
with previously careful, exerting a level of effort to distinguish themselves, a level
that would not be optimal to the previously reckless if they were to choose it. This
will result in previously careful matching in marriage with previously careful.
2.4.3 Mandatory testing regime
2.4.3.1 Common priors
Testing is assumed available in this regime. As pointed out in the literature
review, studies in several countries find that people do not test for HIV/AIDS, even
if free and easily accesible. It may be rational to not resolve uncertainty about one’s
infection status, for instance if there is no cure or the treatment is unavailable or
prohibitively costly. Currently, there is no cure for HIV/AIDS and issues of lack
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of access to treatment and limited availability of free treatment is beginning to
resurface in several countries in Africa. It may be crucial to therefore recognize the
psychic costs of learning one’s status by testing. Let P capture such psychic costs
of testing which has to be overcome if one chooses to learn own infection status.
Under mandatory testing, partners are required by law to test, and each has to
learn own and the other’s status at the time of marriage. Since utility from marrying
a healthy partner is higher than marrying an infected partner, if one is healthy, they
would prefer to marry a healthy partner (I allow for rematching partner’s at some
cost). These rematching costs can be subsumed in the psychic costs of testing P
. An individual if healthy in a mandatory testing regime with low psychic costs
will choose to test and marry a healthy partner. The other option is to test and
remain single or not to test and remain single. For sufficiently large P (.) > 0, the
test and remain single option may be dominated by ‘do not test and remain single’
(and ‘if test, marry’). The maximization problem is to choose between ‘do not test
and remain single’ and ‘test and marry’ a partner of equal or infected status.




Ū − C(es) + δ(1− λ)
{
(1− p(es))Uhh + p(es)U ii
}
+ δλU ii − P (.) >
Max
e
Ū − C(em) + δ(1− λ)
{
(1− p(em))Uh + p(em)U i
}
+ δλU i
Comparing the first order conditions, we derive the conditions to ‘test and
marry’ under mandatory testing regime.
C ′(es)
δ(1− λ)p′(es) (Uh − U i)
=
C ′(em)
δ(1− λ)p′(em) (Uhh − U ii)
(2.2)
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If we assume13 that utility differential between having a healthy marriage and
staying healthy but single is greater than being in an infected marriage and staying
single and infected [Uhh − Uh > U ii − U i], we arrive at ∗∗em>
∗∗
e s from equation () .
Efforts at prevention in period 1 are higher for those who choose to ‘test and marry’
compared to those who prefer to remain ‘untested and single’.
2.4.3.2 Ex-ante heterogenous priors
The psychic costs of testing may be higher for the previously not careful(
P pr > P pc
)
since they expect a higher probability of being infected (λpr > λpc). As
a consequence the likelihood of the previously not careful not testing and remaining
single in the mandatory testing regime is higher than the previously careful. An-
other result if both groups choose to test and marry is that the equilibrium efforts
of the previously careful will be higher than the other group, derived below from
the first order conditions (FOC).
c






. Since p′(epr) =







13In several countries there is an increasing number of HIV positive marriage bureaus as infected
people report that their lives would be much better with a partner. Therefore if we were to make
an argument for the reverse inequality U ii − U i > Uhh − Uh, the interesting outcome ∗∗em<
∗∗
e s
results – i.e., those who choose to be single exert more effort than those choosing to marry.
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2.4.4 “Mandatory testing” vs. “no testing”
A key outcome from mandatory testing is no cross-infections in marriage if
healthy marry healthy. A less obvious result is that equilibrium efforts in period 1 are
higher in mandatory testing compared to the no testing regime. Let us illustrate this
result by comparing the FOC’s in the two regimes with identical initial conditions
and for all choosing to marry (since we assumed a strong preference for marriage,
[Uhh > Uh, U ii > U i]). The “no testing regime” is on the left hand side of the equality
and the “mandatory testing regime” on the right hand side.
C ′(e)
−δ(1− λ) (1−Π(ė)) p′(e) (UH − U I)
=
C ′(e)
δ(1− λ)p′(e) (UH − U I)
(2.3)




em i.e., the efforts at prevention under
mandatory regime (
∗∗
em) are higher than the efforts with no testing regime (
−
em).
This is because of incentives under mandatory regime, which motivates people to
stay healthy with high effort levels in period 1, by rewarding them healthy partners
in marriage. A mandatory pre-marital testing law is akin to an insurance for healthy
people who pay a higher premium in period 1 through efforts and are guaranteed a
healthy marriage in period 2, with information about prospective partner’s health.
This is consequent of the possibility of knowing the infection status and choosing a
healthy partner in mandatory testing.
2.4.5 Voluntary testing regime
Under this regime, testing is available but not enforced as is the case in most
countries. People can voluntarily choose to learn own status and if cultural norms
permit ask partner to test and share information. Norms vary across cultures and
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countries, and in some countries it is relatively costless to mutually exchange in-
formation on infection status. In some parts of the world it is taboo (very costly
to learn partner’s infection status), while in most countries there is at least some
discomfort in bringing up the issue of exchanging test results. An analogy would
be considering a pre-nuptial where issues about mistrust surfaces between couples
before getting married. Prevalent marital customs and norms therefore affect costs
of learning prospective marital partner’s infection status. Therefore, such institu-











The options for an individual in a such a regime are (1) learn own status and
stay single (2) learn own status and marry without mutally learning each other’s
status (3) marry with mutual learning of own and other’s status (4) do not learn
own status and stay single (5) marry without learning each and other’s status.
With our earlier assumptions of preference for marriage, we can rule out option
(1) and (2), if P is sufficiently high. One would choose to test only if the benefits or





which is option (3) or to stay untested and single (4). Option (5)
can be recognized as marrying without testing, akin to the “no testing regime”. The
level of efforts (e) at prevention in period 1, in the voluntary regime are similar to




are sufficiently large, where people choose to marry




are small, the efforts will be similar to
the mandatory testing regime. The mandatory regime removes the cultural norms
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as the impediment to testing [zero institutional (cultural) costs, (N = 0)], more
people will choose to test and marry compared to voluntary regime. In the voluntary
regime where people with preference for marriage will choose “no testing” and marry
without testing option due to the absence of cultural norms of exchanging test
status (or high institutional costs). An outcome of allowing individuals the choice of
testing, as I shall argue in the next section, could result in a sub-optimal equilibrium
with lower social welfare.
2.5 Results and discussion
A mandatory pre-marital testing law is an institution which sets specific rules
for marriage. It specifies that all those who choose to marry (1) will be required
to learn own status 2) will be guaranteed to learn prospective marriage partner’s
health status (3) and the marriage partner is in turn guaranteed information about
an individual’s health status. The regime negates the gamble of possibly marrying an
infected partner as in the “no-testing regime” if one has incurred the costs of staying
healthy. It imposes the psychic costs of learning own status on everybody choosing
to marry. It motivates safe behavior by ensuring choice of healthy partner. The
fear of having to learn that one is infected if one chooses to marry, may additionally
motivate people to exert higher efforts at preventing disease in the period prior
to marriage. This behavioral outcome is absent in voluntary testing regime, where
individual members will still have a positive probability of finding another individual
who similarly chooses not to test. The psychic costs of learning P are aggravated
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by the institutional costs N , which further hinders mutual testing. The structure of
social interactions may not evolve quickly to respond to prevalence of disease and the
disease dynamics. Governments which may recognize any possibility of explosion of
asymptomatic diseases like HIV have to contend with trade-offs. The benefits from
higher effort levels at prevention are the resulting lowered incidence, lowered cross-
infections in marriages due to higher likelihood of assortive matching. Such benefits
may outweigh the imposed psychic costs on the population under a mandatory
testing regime and increased marginal cost at prevention in the pre-marital period.
If early treatment has benefits, this in turn will lead to higher welfare for the tested.
I briefly make a case for a possible interesting fallout of mandatory testing – an
increase in early testing, which improves the health of the already infected due to
early treatment.
In this context, let us go back to the individual maximization problem and
arrive at possible equilibria in the different regimes by introducing the benefits of
early treatment.
Table 1, summarizes the trade-offs faced by an individual in the different
regimes. In addition to the results from the earlier maximization problem, we include
the benefits of testing. If tested before period 2, the early treatment increases the
utility of the infected individuals from U I to U I+ (if infected and tested at the end
of period 1) or U I++(if infected and tested before period 1). In the mandatory
testing regime [Case 15 to 20 in Table 1], the expected utility maximizers choosing
marriage over single will (stipulated testing) have to incur the psychic costs (−P 1)
at end of period 1. They also recognize the benefits of early testing (in period 0)
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which will yield them a higher utility if infected. As they prefer marriage they will
necessarily have to submit to testing (prior to period 1), it may be beneficial to get
tested even earlier (in period 0) if the benefits outweigh the costs (Case 17 to 20).
The trade-off14 is the possibility of being infected in period 0 and exerting a higher
marginal efforts at prevention rather than reaping the benefits of early treatment.
With heterogenous priors, we can expect an increased likelihood of the previously
reckless choosing early testing if the net treatment benefits are high.
The voluntary testing regime harbors the likelihood of being married without
undergoing the psychological and institutional costs of testing. The fear of learning
interacts with the cultural norms to result in an outcome of increased uncertainty in
the marital institution. Individuals not mandated to test in the future, may choose
not to recognize the benefits of early testing as well. Although the possibility of the
outcome with high social welfare as in mandatory testing is possible [case 11 to 14],
a choice in testing may result in the “tragedy of the commons” of lowered efforts in
period 1 and lower expected returns in marriage, identical to the “no testing regime”
outcome [case 7 or 8].
2.6 Conclusion
A social planner is confronted with trade-offs in mandatory and voluntary
regimes. The parameters he must consider are the infection rate (prevalence λ),
the disease dynamics (Π), the treatment availability, access and its costs (−T ) (and
14Note that the psychic costs also subsumes the costs of stigma if infected
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benefits). Although he may not be able to influence the psychic costs immediately
15if an aysmptomatic disease is expected to register an explosive growth, and the
prevalent customs have been unable to evolve rapidly to respond with high levels of
voluntary testing, a mandated law could undo some of the institutional costs of get-
ting a partner to test [Table 2 provides a brief schema of social welfare]. As discussed
a mandated law may encourage early testing and thereby segregate the infected and
the healthy early. The planner will have to consider the possible discriminatory
outcomes (and likely social sanction of the infected16) and compare it with the in-
creased efficiency of efforts17at prevention by those testing healthy in period 0 and
the lowered incidence, lowered likelihood of cross-infections in marriage (period 1)
and benefits of early treatment for the infected. It is possible that there may be
cases where the psychic costs are prohibitively high and the population collectively
choose not to resolve such uncertainty. A case may be where the incidence of HIV is
extremely high, but people would be better-off without learning their status [Case
15Over time, stigma could be reduced by creating awareness. Besides, a mandated testing law
removes the taboo from testing, which may considerably lower the psychic costs of going to test.
16Luginaah et al (2005) examine the impact of church mandated testing in Ghana. Their results
reveal how broader social impacts of HIV testing for those planning to marry may extend beyond
individuals or couples in different cultural contexts. The findings also support the view that
programs for Ghana cannot be neutral to cultural values and need to be tailored for particular
(ethnic) populations.
17The early testing will result in a reallocation ofthe efforts are higher for those testing healthy.
The infected will choose early treatment. The early testing results will further reallocate efforts
of period 1 for healthy-healthy and infected-infected (low or no effort), and high efforts if healthy
are in a relationship with infected.
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5 in Table 2].
The mandatory pre-marital testing law is controversial and human rights ac-
tivists oppose it on grounds of privacy violation due to poor implementation. This
paper brings an economic insight about the gains from reduced uncertainty due to
mandatory testing. Governments have to carefully consider the trade-offs inherent
in the legal institutions governing marriage. In developing a rough schema of trade-
offs under different regimes and prevailing conditions, this paper informs the debate
on mandated HIV testing.
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2.8.1.2 Ex-ante heterogenous priors
The maximization problem for previously careful,
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FOC for previously careful:
=⇒ C ′(e) = −δ(1− λpc) (1−Π(ė)) p′(e)
(
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)
(2.4)
FOC for previously not careful:
=⇒ C ′(e) = −δ(1− λpr) (1−Π(ė)) p′(e)
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UH − U I
)
(2.5)
The transition probability will be a function of the aggregate efforts of both























We know that p(e) is linear. Therefore p′(e) is a constant for all e, p′(epc) =
p′(epr)
=⇒ C ′(epc) > C ′(epr)






Chapter 3: Neighbors Can Make You Sick: Health Externalities of
Dirty Drains and Open Defecation
3.1 Introduction
Over a billion people lack access to clean drinking water and over twice as
many do not have access to hygienic sanitation facilities (UNDP 2013). Despite
a steady decline in open defecation rates over the past two decades in South Asia,
India continues to have the largest number of people defecating in the open: 597 mil-
lion people, about half the population, according to recent estimates (WHO 2014).
1.9 million deaths from diarrheal disease in 2004 are attributable to unsafe water
and sanitation, including lack of hygiene (WHO, 2004). In India 80% of diseases
are water related: over 4 hundred thousand children die every year due to unsafe
drinking water, unsafe water makes 1 in 5 babies ill every fortnight (Sharma, 2006).
It is clear that much work needs to be done to meet the Millennium Developmental
Goals.
The first order effects of access to clean water, and of personal hygiene and
sanitation on health have been well documented (Merrick, 1985; Behrman and Wolfe
1987; Esrey et al. 1991; Lavy et al. 1996; Lee, Rosenweig and Pitt 1997; Jalan and
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Ravallion 2003; and Gamper-Rabindran, Khan and Timmins, 2010). Economists
have recently begun studying the effects of community hygiene and sanitation such
as open defecation (Shah et al 2014; Hammer and Spears 2013; Spears 2012; Chris-
tensen et al 2014). Hammers and Spears (2013) use a randomized controlled experi-
ment to estimate the effects of a village-level community sanitation program on child
health. They find that the program caused a large average increase in child height.
In a related work, Spears (2012) estimates an average effect of Total Sanitation Cam-
paign (TSC)1 on rural Indian children’s health. Matching survey and census data
on health outcomes to administrative records and program rules, and by exploiting
exogenous variation in the timing of program implementation, Spears finds that the
TSC reduced infant mortality and increased children’s height. In a follow-up study,
Spears and Lamba (2012) find that early life exposure to improved rural sanitation
due to the TSC additionally caused an increase in cognitive achievement at age six,
using a similar approach to identification.
Another recent work uses a randomized experimental design in rural East Java
to evaluate a sanitation intervention consisting of information (to trigger disgust at
open defecation) rather than financial assistance (Shah et al 2013). They find that
the program significantly increased toilet construction, effected behavioral change
amongst households with no private toilets, and had significant impacts on child
1This program offered a partial construction subsidy for building household latrines, and most
importantly provided for village-level community sanitation mobilization. This was especially
encouraged by the Clean Village Prize, a cash incentive to the leaders of villages that eliminate
open defecation.
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health. Relevant to the context of our study, they find that toilet construction is
however more effective at reducing open defecation than behavioral change but was
hindered by the lack of financial assistance.
Our paper examines the health externalities of hygiene arising from a com-
plementary network good, drains in the village. We find that the quality of drains
have large and significant impact on the incidence of water borne disease. We find
that poor quality drains combined with high levels of open defecation, expectedly
multiply the health impacts. Importantly, we find evidence that improved drains
can lower the exposure and thereby mitigate the impact of fecal contamination from
open defecation. Our paper uses a household level dataset and controls for a wide
range of correlated variables to evidence for this mechanism linking open defecation
with poor health and human capital accumulation. A causal interpretation of the
relationship between water-borne disease incidence and neighborhood drain quality
depends importantly on the estimated correlation between these two measures being
quantitatively robust to conditioning on additional correlates of unobserved factors
including information (awareness of water borne disease vectors), beliefs (such as
open defecation construed as healthy) and other channels (social capital such as
community networks). Our assessment of robustness when we control for battery
of observed correlates is in line with Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005), as we exam-
ine whether the estimated correlation is much affected by the inclusion of additional
controls that, a priori, should be correlated with neighborhood drain quality through
their correlation with unobserved or misspecified variables. If these unobservables
are indeed important sources of the observed correlation between health outcomes
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and neighborhood drain quality, then adding the controls should have a substan-
tial effect on the estimated correlation coefficients. The magnitude and statistical
significance of our estimated effect of drain quality on health persists despite the
addition of these controls.
Our finding that drains play a key role in determining the water borne dis-
ease impact on households is robust to inclusion of several other factors, including
reported awareness of water borne disease transmission, oral - fecal route and the
importance of safe toilets. Although, further experimental work would be required
to unpack the role of the each of the factors in the fecal oral route, this paper
provides strong evidence to examine the role of drains in this vector of transmission.
To make a case for the role of improving quality of drains alongside higher
access to toilets, we present a simple model of health externalities of households’
hygiene and sanitation, showing how the choices of one household affects ill-health
incidences of other households. The model incorporates the features from agricul-
tural household models (Bardhan and Udry, 1999) and models of reciprocal exter-
nalities (Dasgupta, 1993). Then using micro level survey data of 1,530 households
in rural Uttarakhand, India, we show that both household and community hygiene
and sanitation are significant inputs in the determination of households’ ill-health
incidences (i.e. diarrhea, cholera, typhoid, dysentery, worm infestation and jaun-
dice), with the latter having a greater impact than the former, over and above effects
attributable to households’ socioeconomic status. Our key result is that there is a
large health externality of community level sanitation, specifically, quality of drains.
Additionally, we explore the determinants of households’ hygiene and sanitation,
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and of water availability inside the house. We document that while households’
hygiene and sanitation choices are strongly correlated with their economic status,
access to water inside the house, and awareness about the causes of diarrhea, and
a household’s education, occupation and social status. Access to water is corre-
lated with a household’s economic status and the geographical characteristics of the
villages. Finally, we discuss the policy implications.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a
simple model of health externalities of households’ hygiene and sanitation. Section
3 discusses the context and data including measurements of ill-health of household.
In Section 4, we discuss empirical framework and estimation strategy. The results
are presented in Section 5. Section 6 explores the factors of households’ hygiene and
sanitation, and of the availability of water supply. We conclude in Section 7.
3.2 Theory
Our theoretical model incorporates features from two kinds of widely used
models: agricultural household models (Bardhan and Udry, 1999) and models of
reciprocal externalities (Dasgupta, 1993). We assume that there are two identical
villagers, A and B. A and B subscripts are used to denote these two villagers. We
concentrate on A’s choices, and point the resulting externalities these choices by A
imply for B. Since villagers are identical, by symmetry the reverse holds for A when
B makes choices.
We assume that the villagers enjoy utility arising from consumption of cooked
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food (CF ), consumption of other goods (COther), sickness (S) and leisure time (tL).
U = U(CF , COther, S, tL) (3.1)
Sickness is assumed to be a function of bacterial exposer (E), consumption of cooked
food, and individual characteristics (Zi).
S = S(E,CF , Z
i) (3.2)
Bacterial contamination is a complex phenomenon. For simplicity, we assume that
bacterial exposure experienced by A is an additively separable function of a baseline
level of exposure (E0), water supply inside the house of A (WA), latrine not depen-
dent on water inside A’s house (LNWA ), and latrine dependent on water inside A’s
house (LWA ). In addition, bacterial exposure depends on the total level of cleaning of
drains in the village, given by DA+DB, where A pays for DA and B for DB. Finally,
bacterial exposure experienced by A also depends on whether B uses a latrine inside
his/her house, whether with water or not. Thus,
EA = E0−g1(WA)−g2(LNWA )−g3(LWA (WA))−g4(LNWB )−g5(LWB (WB))−g6(DA+DB),
(3.3)
where the g’s denote functions. We expect g2 and g3 to have stronger effects than g4
and g5. By symmetry, B has the same function, with subscripts swapped. Also, if
WA is zero, then we would expec g1 to be zero, and similarly for the other functions
in (3). If the latrine used by A uses water, then the use of that latrine is facilitated
by provision of water supply inside A’s house. In writing (3), we are treating water
inside the house and the presence of the latrine inside the house as continuous
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variables whereas they are discrete. However, we will stay with this for the simplicity
of the exposition, and when the first order conditions (FOCs) are derived, will
indicate how the substance of the FOCs is not different even if the we consider
discreteness.
We assume that A and B have two sources of income: wage income and self-
production of agricultural goods. We denote time spent working outside by tOW , and
the wage received by pW . We expect pW to depend on educational characteristics
(ZE) and occupation (ZO). We denote time spent working on the villager’s own
land by tIW . We expect output on this land, O, to be a function of:
O = O(tIWk(S), Z
L), (3.4)
where k is a shift operator depending on sickness, and ZL is the land owned. The
dependence of the villager’s labor productivity on his/her health, is a feature of
efficiency wage models (Bardhan and Udry, 1993).
We assume that the villager sells all his/her agricultural output, and together
with his/her wage earnings, buys food, other consumables, water supply, latrine





O = pFCF + pOtherCOther + pwaterW + p
NW
L L
NW + pWL L
W + pDD (3.5)
Since water supply inside the house and latrine have important discrete and durable
components, their ‘prices’ in (5) can be thought of as annualized costs. The villager’s
time constraint is:
T = tL − S − tOW − tIW (3.6)
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The villager aims to maximize his/her utility subject to the time and budget con-
straints. We substitute for tL from (6) into the utility function, and then maximize
the resulting utility subject to the budget constraint. Denoting the Lagrange by J,











− λpF = 0 (3.7)
In (7), the villager gets two kinds of benefits from consuming an extra unit of food:
the direct utility from eating and the utility from lower sickness. The cost of the
extra unit of food in utility terms is the product of the multiplier and the price of
food.
































− λpwater = 0 (3.9)
In the FOC (9) we see that having water in the house leads to the following ben-
efits through less sickness, a direct utility benefit, greater leisure time, and greater
productivity of the villager in agricultural production. The reduction in sickness is
through a reduction in bacterial exposure which in turn is through the direct effect
of water in the house and the indirect effect of water availability on latrines that
use water.
As we have said above, water supply inside the house versus getting water
supply inside the house has an important discrete and durable component. Our
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interest is in tracing the pathways of effects between health and poverty and in
embedded externalities. It is easy to see the discrete version of (9), in which the
household will go in for the water supply if the benefits exceed the costs. The














[−∆E1WA −∆E3WA] > XWA, if WA > 0, (3.10)
where ∆E1WA denotes the reduction in bacterial contamination due to water supply
inside A’s house, and ∆E3WA denotes the reduction in B due to water supply inside
A’s house (via encouraging water latrines). Also XWA denotes the expenditure on
WA. For the rest of FOCs, we will treat the discrete choices as continuous.
If A only considers the effect of water supply on his own utility, he/she will
ignore the positive externality of water supply inside his/her house on B. This is





















The increase in latrine use inside A’s house by A reduces bacterial exposure of B
through the function g5 in (11). This lower bacterial exposure reduces B’s sick-
ness and affects B’s utility directly, through increased leisure and through greater
productivity when B works on his/her farm.
The FOC arising out of the choice of latrines is similar to (9), and these choices











































− λpLW = 0 (3.13)





















− λpD = 0 (3.14)
The choice of level of cleaning of drains by a household (DA) that affects the quality
of drains, a key channel of transmission as we show in our empirical results. It is
far more likely to suffer from sub-optimal provision than that of water supplied in
A’s house or latrine inside A’s house, because A will be tempted to free-ride on B’s
provision of DB, a tendency that will be strengthened if the number of agents is
large.
Finally, we have the conditions relating to choice of how much time is spent





+ λpW = 0 (3.15)












In (16) the income earned is affected by the level of sickness, and the cost is the loss
of utility from reduced leisure.
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3.3 Context and Data
Uttarakhand is the 27th state of India and was carved out of Uttar Pradesh
(geographically the largest state in India) on November 9, 2000. The state has two
Divisions (Garhwal and Kumaun), with 13 Districts, which can be grouped into
three distinct geographical regions: the High mountain region, the Mid-mountain
region and the Terai region. It is spread over an area of 55,845 square kilometers
having 78 Tehsils, 95 blocks and 7,227 Gram Panchayats. It has a total of 16,826
inhabitated villages, 86 cities/towns and only five are major cities with population
over 100,000. Its population is 8.5 millions with average density of 159 persons per
square kilometer, which varies from as high as 612 in Haridwar and 414 in Dehradun
districts to as low as 37 in Uttarkashi. 89% of the villages have population less than
500. The decadal population growth rate is 20.41% (against 21.54% for the country)
and the infant and maternal mortality rates are 42 and 517 respectively, which are
higher than the national averages. The sex ratio in the state is 962 as compared to
933 for the country.
Only half of the state is estimated to be fully covered by functioning water
supply schemes. In addition, the state faces severe water shortages. Nearly 30%
of the schemes suffer from a decrease in the availability of water, especially during
the summer months, because of depletion of water sources. This causes some of
the villagers to spend one to three hours per day collecting water for domestic uses.
While water-related diseases are a major health problem for the rural areas in the
state, particularly for infants and children. For instance, at any given time, 18% of
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all children suffer from diarrhea. Therefore, the state government prioritized rural
water supply and sanitation as a key area of its development agenda in its Tenth
Plan (2003-7).
In terms of socioeconomic characteristics, Uttarakhand is not very different
from the other states of India. But what distinguishes it from other states of India,
is its geographical features wherein 93% of the area of the state is hilly and 63%
of the land is covered with forests. Being primarily a hilly state, it has starting
disadvantages for the prosperity of agriculture, and easy accessibility of clean drink-
ing water vis-a-vis other states of India. Thus, some of the factors that affect the
incidences of ill-health and economic status of households in the state are expected
to be distinctively different from the factors of poverty and ill-health incidences in
other states.
We use the survey data of 1,530 households from rural regions of Uttarakhand.
The data was collected as the part of an exercise to develop a Strategy for Sanitation
and Hygiene promotion conducted by The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI),
New Delhi, with support from the World Bank. The primary survey involved 39
gram panchayats, the smallest administrative unit at the rural level spread across all
thirteen districts of rural Uttarakhand. The 39 gram panchayats (three per district),
were selected based on multiple criteria. Gram panchayats were selected from a list
of representative gram panchayats provided by State Water and Sanitation Mission.
In addition, villages were selected to ensure representation from villages with vary-
ing characteristics. The sample villages were also chosen from villages both with
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and without the Swajal program2, an earlier the World Bank and the Government
of India funded program for ensuring safe water access to some of the villages in the
state. More specifically, 12 out of 39 Gram Panchayats were covered under the Swa-
jal program; and 9 out of 39 villages were in plains. A structured questionnaire was
used to collect both the quantitative and qualitative data on family characteristics,
income and expenditures, poverty status, health, sanitation, and hygiene behavior.
The survey was implemented between November 2004 and January 2005.
3.3.1 Measures of Household’s ill-Health
We use a count measure as our dependent variable: household’s incidence of
water borne diseases. It captures the household’s incidences of ill-health defined
as the number of household members with incidents of water borne diseases (i.e.
diarrhea, cholera, typhoid, dysentery, worm infestation and jaundice). To arrive at
this measure of health at the household-level, each member of the household a value
of 1 is assigned if he/she had suffered from any (some or all) of the ailments in the
twelve months preceding the survey date. Next, members of the household having
suffered from any of the ailments are aggregated. Being a discrete count measure,
we use count data models. The estimation equations are specified following with
implications from theory.
2Swajal program is a World Bank assisted project between 1996-2002 to improve water supply
and environmental sanitation services in some of the water scarce regions of the state
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3.3.2 Measures of community level sanitation
The key empirical contribution of this paper is providing evidence for commu-
nity level sanitation, particularly evidencing the link between quality of drains and
water borne disease incidence.
We construct two measures to analyze the community level negative externali-
ties of poor sanitation practices. Our first measure is a village level average of access
to toilets as reported in the household survey. These averages are highly correlated
to two other independent surveys conducted in 2001 and 20033. Villages with higher
percentage households having access to latrines would correspondingly have lower
percentage members practicing open defecation.
Our second measure of community level sanitation is the reported quality of
drains around the household. The households had to report their drain quality on
a scale going from very dirty to very clean4. We construct a binary variable that
takes the value of 1 if the a household’s neighborhood drainage is reported clean or
3Census reports the average at 31% and another sample survey (RGNDWM) in 2003 puts the
sanitation coverage at 22% compared to 51% in the survey data used in this paper. Besides the
increase in sanitation coverage between the first two surveys due to high rate of toilet construction
in the last two years, disparity in the coverage figures may be attributed to the differences in the
definition of individual household latrines. The RGNDWM survey includes only sanitary latrines
in its coverage data, excluding pit latrines and other latrines, which were included in the Census
data
4The full scale of options available to the respondents in the survey were: very dirty; dirty;
moderate; clean; very clean
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very clean5.
Our measure of village level latrine average, following from our model hypothe-
sizes that contamination load at the village level is a negative externality and affects
the average health of all the households in the village. In essence it captures the
effect of one household’s lack of access to safe toilets, increasing the contamination
load on neighbors and other members in the village due to open defecation. Spears
(2012) work provides evidence for the interaction of open defecation with population
density in its effect of children’s health, suggesting negative externalities. Hammer
and Spears (2013) randomized a community level sanitation intervention and find
similar evidence for spillovers of safe household sanitation practices (owning and
using latrine) on other local households.
Since the village level sanitation average would preclude us from using a fixed
effects model to control for unobservable factors at the village level, we interact it
with the drain quality in our specification testing for interaction between the two
community level effects. In addition to allowing us to estimate a fixed effects model,
this specification also examines the overall reduction in exposure to contamination,
including fecal load, due to clean and safe drains. Clean drains are either fully or
partially covered, often lined with cement or concrete, if not piped to prevent seepage
and ground water contamination. They are regularly maintained to keep them
unclogged and free flowing to dispose waste water. Unclean drains are characterized
by poor construction, usually open and unlined channels resulting in seepage into the
5We also construct measures of the corollary, a dirty dummy for those households reporting
drains being dirty or very dirty.
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soil. Combined with poor maintenance, they are often clogged and overflow into the
streets6. Unclean drains present higher exposure likelihood to fecal contamination as
it is open/overflowing and seepage would also lead to ground water contamination.
3.3.3 Potential Determinants of Households’ ill-Health
The list of potential determinants of household’s ill-health are presented in
Table 1. It includes household size, poverty status of the household, educational
achievements of the head (male or female) of household, household’s hygiene behav-
ior, and community hygiene behavior.
We use household size as a control variable because a large household is more
likely to have higher number of total ill-health incidences than a small household.
The economic status of the household is captured by inclusion of a measure repre-
senting the household’s poverty status. Households were to asked to identify their
poverty status in the survey. Thus poverty status is self-reported by households.
In India, poverty is officially linked to a nutritional intake as measured in calories.
The Planning Commission of the Government of India defines poverty lines as a per
capita monthly expenditure of Rs. 49 for the rural areas and Rs. 57 in urban areas
at 1973-74 all-India prices. These poverty lines correspond to a total household
per capita expenditure sufficient to provide, in addition to basic non-food items -
clothing, transport - a daily intake of 2,400 calories per person in rural areas and
2100 in urban areas (WB, 1997). Individuals who do not meet these calorie norms
fall below the poverty line. The Government of India issues differential ration cards
6There is a high positive correlation in our data between unclean streets and unclean drains
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which entitles households to some government supplies at subsidized prices (e.g.
rice, sugar, and Kerosene oil). Poor households, below the poverty line are entitled
to other governmental support as well.
One of the key components of human capital endowments of households in
the literature is educational achievements of the household head. Many studies
including Pritchett and Summers (1996) have shown that the income of an individual
is positively associated with his or her educational achievements. Moreover, we can
reasonably expect that a household’s hygiene behavior is also determined by it’s
level of education. In particular, a household with an educated (or with higher
average level of educational achievement) household head is expected to have better
hygiene behavior than a household with an uneducated (or less educated) head.
To account for education, we define four dummy variables representing if the head
of the household is illiterate (no formal schooling at all), primary school educated,
high school educated, and college educated respectively. However, in order to avoid
“dummy variable trap” we drop the dummy variable representing household head
with no formal schooling. Consequently, marginal effects of included education
variables convey the relative contribution of a particular education level compared
to no schooling at all.
We measure the household’s hygiene practice and sanitation by a variable
representing whether the household has access to latrine inside the house. It is
a binary dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the household has access to
latrine inside the house; otherwise it takes the value of zero.
Table 2 presents corresponding summary statistics of the defined data charac-
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teristics. Note that approximately 59% of the households in the sample are below
poverty line (or in poverty status); 39.4% of the household heads are illiterate, 31.2%
of the household heads have the primary schooling as their highest education, 22.6%
have high school eduation, while only 6.0% of the all household heads have college
education. 38% of villages are located in plain terrain. As far as the households’ hy-
giene is concerned, we find from Table 1 that approximately 51% of the households
in the village have latrine availability inside their houses, and 41% of the households
have water availability inside the house. Regarding community hygiene, we find
that on average only 51% of the households in a village have access to latrine inside
their houses, and approximately 8% of drains in the village are reported clean.
3.4 Empirical Models and Estimation Strategy
Our estimation strategy exploits the variation in reported drain quality around
the household as a measure of the externality from the network good - drains around
the household. As predicted by our model, there would be undersupply of efforts
in keeping the drains clean arising from the public good nature of drains and each
household may have incentives to free-ride on provision of efforts by other households
to keep the drain network unclogged and flowing. We assume that the reported
drain quality capture the average effort of other households connected to the drain
network and thereby a measure that captures the health externalities of unclean
drains. Our dependent variable of interest is the incidence of water borne diseases
in the households and our estimation strategy we control for a variety of channels
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in the literature that have been documented to cause water borne disease. After
the inclusion of these channels and controlling for village level fixed effects, our
model specification would identify the effect of reported drain quality on ill health
incidence.
The dependent variable being the number of household members reporting
from suffering at least one incident of any of the six water borne diseases could go
from zero to the maximum number of members in the household. We control for the
number of members in the household by including them as an explanatory variable.
Since the dependent variable takes discrete values, we naturally estimated poisson
specifications, but rejected them in favor of negative binomial models, due to over
dispersion in the dependent variable.
The other variable of interest that measures sanitation externalities at the
village level is the percentage households in the village with toilet access. We es-
timate the effect of this variable alongside drain quality variable in the first set of
specifications. We drop the “% village toilet” variable from our village fixed effects
estimations, as they would not vary within the villages, and only include “neighbor-
hood drain” variable to measure the community level health externalities of poor
sanitation practices. Our original specification without fixed effects is as follows:
Hij = β0 + β1 ∗% village toiletj + β2 ∗ Neighborhood drain cleanij + β3 ∗ HH sizei+
(3.17)
β4 ∗ Program villagej + β5 ∗ HH latrineij + β6 ∗ Plain dummyj + β7 ∗ HH level factorsij + εi
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Our primary specification are with village level fixed effects (θj) and thereby
excludes explanatory variables that do not vary within the village, below:
Hij = β0+β1∗Neighborhood drain cleanij+β2∗HH sizei+β3∗HH latrineij+β4∗HH level factorsij+θj+εi
(3.18)
The household level (HH) factors we include in the original specification be-
sides size of the HH or number of family members, whether drinking water is away
from the latrine, whether drinking water is covered and the poverty status of the
household. Now, poverty status besides being documented to influence disease inci-
dence through prevention and vulnerability, also needs to be addressed for feedback
effects. There are several studies in the health economics and related literature
about the simultaneous relationship between poor health and poverty. Poverty af-
fects health status, but in turn poor health lowers the ability to work and therefore
lowers income, leading to a vicious cycle of poor health and low incomes. We note
that our measure of ill health, water borne disease incidents and not the duration
or the gravity of these incidents. Using this measure of incidence mitigates the
feedback effect, unlike using length and gravity of sickness, where there might be
further more variation between those who are poor and the other households who
may be capable of dealing with these sickness episodes swiftly and also reduce the
gravity. Nevertheless, we address the possible endogeneity between poverty status
and ill health episodes by instrumenting for poverty.
114
3.4.1 Poverty endogenous?
In estimating the regression equation (in 17 &18), we have to address the pos-
sibility of the explanatory variable, poverty status, being potentially endogenous.7
If endogenous, we use the IV estimation procedure to obtain consistent and efficient
parameter estimates of the model in (17 &18). Here an additional contribution of
our paper is arguing for caste and land ownership as instruments for poverty status
in the next section. As our dependent variable, ill health incidence in the household
(H) is a count variable, we use an Instrumental Variables Poisson model. This model
is estimated by GMM methods to correct for the endogeneity of poverty status.
3.4.2 Instrument for Poverty Status
The first stage regression for IV strategy is:
Poverty Status∗i = π0 + π1 ∗ Castei + π2 ∗Xi + µi (3.19)
where Castei is the instrumental variable, which takes the value of 1 if the household
is identified to be Scheduled Caste or Tribe; otherwise it takes the value 0; and Xi
7There is large body of empirical literature documenting economic effects of health (Strauss,
1986; Fogel, 1994; Strauss and Thomas, 1998; Glick and Sahn, 1998; Schultz, 1999, 2001, 2002;
Thomas and Frankenberg, 2002; Case, Lubotsky and Paxson, 2002; Bloom and Mahal, 1997; Bloom
and Sachs, 1998; Bloom and Canning, 2000; Bhargava et al., 2001; Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla,
2001). Using the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), a multiyear random sample of households
in the US, Smith (1999) found people with disease onset tend to draw down on household wealth
in a range of 3,620 to 25,371 dollars, depending on onset of severity and income levels.
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are other control variables (mainly geography). We argue for a second instrument,
the ownership of land by the household. Both the instruments perform jointly and
independently as the significant determinant of poverty status in the first stage (over
the thumb rule of 10, while also exceeding the Stock-Yogo critical values for multiple
instruments).
3.4.2.1 Caste and land dummy
Caste is historically and exogenously determined and in the Indian context
widely recognized as influencing social and economic outcomes (Srinivas 1955). Be-
sides, caste and land ownership could be inter related, with a high correlation be-
tween belonging to a lower caste8 and low land ownership. Anderson (2011) uses
village level variation in caste dominance (caste owning the majority of land) to
identify the trade breakdown in irrigation water across caste groups resulting in
higher incomes for low-caste households residing in villages dominated by a low
caste. Our argument for exogeneity of caste is based on the fact that one is assigned
to a caste grouping by birth (Srinivas 1955; Dumont 1970). Caste is hereditarily
transmitted and there is no possibility of individuals or groups migrating to a differ-
ent caste group (ibid). A stronger claim of the exogeneity of village level variation
in caste dominance with regard to economic outcomes in large parts of India today
has been previously argued in the economics literature (Banerjee and Somanathan
2000; Besley and Burgess 2000; Anderson 2011). Their claim is based on the his-
8We use a binary classification with lower castes belonging to either Scheduled Caste or Sched-
uled Tribe in this paper
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torical record of caste composition and land settlement patterns that have be stable
for centuries. Recent work by Kaivan Munshi and Mark Rosenzweig (2005) also
evidence for the fact that there is very little caste-based migration in India.
Our sample from Uttarakhand villages have both upper castes (predominantly
Rajputs and Brahmins) and lower castes (26%) consisting of several sub groups
belonging to SC/ST classification. There is also variation in land ownership within
and across the caste classification. In our survey 54% of the lower caste households
own land compared to 75% for other castes. The 54% is ownership of some land,
but on the intensive margin, of those who own land, other castes own significantly
more than the lower caste households.
Poverty status of a household will not influence the caste, as we noted that
individuals inherit caste from their parents by birth. Therefore caste is exogenous
to poverty status. Caste is likely to affect water borne disease incidence primarily
through socio-economic status of a household. If SC/ST households are located in
segregated neighborhoods and may have higher exposure to contamination due to
proximity this would not satisfy the exclusion restriction. Owning land is associ-
ated with higher agricultural income and therefore lower likelihood of BPL status
(poverty). We do not expect land ownership to affect water borne disease incidence
directly, unless the households owning land are located in neighborhoods that have
differential exposure to fecal contamination. There is no evidence for this in our
sample and a priori, we do not expect such variation in exposure resulting from
land ownership by itself.
The Poverty Status* is the household’s unobserved poverty status, or propen-
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sity to be poor. What we observe is a binary variable, Poverty Status, indicating
whether the household is poor (or in poverty status):
PovertyStatusi =

0 if PovertyStatusi ≤ z
1 if PovertyStatusi > z
The results of this regression in Table 2-3 show that Caste is statistically
significant predictor of Poverty Status*.
3.5 Empirical Findings
3.5.1 No fixed effects
Table 3 presents the estimates of impact of neighborhood drain clean dummy
and includes “% village toilet”, our first primary specification without fixed effects
(equation 17). The main estimate of interest are in the first two rows: a large
and statistically significant (at 1%) effect. As we discussed earlier, we progressively
augment our primary specification with other relevant controls at the household
level. Note that including the controls increases the precision on our estimates,
particularly inclusion of gender and age of the head of the household9. The last
two columns have lower observations, as about 100 households could not identify
the head of the household,largely because it was not clearly defined within the
household. Due to higher precision with the inclusion of controls, our preferred
estimates include the full set of household level controls.
9Development economics literature has documented women headed households to allocate re-
sources differently from male headed household, resulting to variation to developmental outcomes
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3.5.2 Village fixed effects
Table 4 presents the estimates of the impact of neighborhood drain clean
dummy including fixed effects at the gram panchayat level.10 One gram panchayat
can administer multiple villages, but in our sample, there is little variation within
the gram panchayat: 39 gram panchayats contains 46 villages. Standard errors are
clustered at the gram panchayat level.
The estimate on the neighborhood drain clean dummy even after the inclusion
of fixed effects shows a large negative impact on water borne disease incidents in the
household. As expected, the household size control variable shows a positive and
significant effect on the number of members reporting ill health episodes. Having
an individual household latrine, a key determinant of household health, as expected
shows to have a negative effect. Having the drinking water source away from a la-
trine (10 meters at least) shows up the expected sign. The poor household dummy
(reported BPL households) do not seem to be strong predictors of ill-health inci-
dents. As we noted earlier, our dependent variable is defined as number of incidents
rather than the gravity of length of each episode, which might explain why poverty
is not persistently significant predictor. The coefficients on the controls are in the
expected direction (although we are surprised some of them are not significant), and
are only shown in Table 3 and 4 for completeness, but not in the later tables as they
are not of interest in this paper.
10The gram panchayat is the lowest administrative unit with an elected body of officials including
the village head (Sarpanch).
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To interpret our results in terms of incidence rate, we find that the drain clean
dummy has an incident rate of 0.33 times the reference group incidence rate (those
with dirty drains). In other words, the dirty drain households have over three times
higher risk of getting water borne disease episodes compared to those households
reporting clean drains. We understand that this is a large estimate, but related
work estimating the impact of open defecation on height and other measures child
health find similar range of effects as well. Our finding of large effects we interpret
as a call for further study. Another relevant comparison for cost benefit analysis
is juxtaposing it with the incidence rate on households having toilets compared to
those without toilets. Those with toilets have 0.65 times the incident rate compared
to those without. Essentially, having clean drains seem to have bigger impact that
having access to own toilets (almost twice as much).
3.5.3 Interaction effect
The externalities in our paper, 1) open defecation and 2) dirty drain effects are
interlinked, in that clogged and overflowing drains exasperate the problem of open
defecation. Ideally, we would have liked to unpack their effects separately, even if a
reduced form through a fixed effects model. Since a village level contamination load
effect is not amenable in itself to inclusion of village level fixed effects, we exploit the
fact that the interaction of the two effects are causal to the level of contamination
exposure. Our theoretical model does not directly capture this interaction effect, but
implicitly via the differential exposure to contaminants of own and other household
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latrine conditional on water provision inside the house. We estimate this interaction
effect of clean drains with percentage households in the village without access to
toilets, presented in Table 5. Here the interpretation is involved, but the results
indicate that clean drains mitigate the effect of fecal contamination, despite the
levels of open defecation. This is particularly relevant for policies on subsidies, if it
is the case that improved drain quality can reduce the burden of open defecation
impact 11.
11It suggests that a multi pronged strategy is necessitated when addressing the open defecation
issue in the developing world. The network nature of the drains and the free riding associated
with this public good would imply that rather than just focus on subsidies for individual latrine
construction, emphasis should be given to a community or village level subsidy for improving the
network goods. The Total Sanitation Campaign program by the Indian government, is a good
example of community level incentives. Villages certified as open defecation free receive a trophy
and a cash prize. Only 4 percent of all Indian villages have won the prize (Hammer & Spears 2013),
but community level incentives/subsidies for improving quality of drains, our results suggest may
have significant effects on reducing water borne disease incidents. Such village/community level
incentives are crucial, additionally since toilet construction is hindered by the fact that pipelines
transporting the cumulatively discharged waste to a safe point needs collective resources. Even
pit latrines need to be maintained and cleaned periodically depending on the size of the pit, and
assistance/support is required to trucks service villages at an affordable cost. Another option is
getting a collective pit based on the size of the neighborhood and technology support to extract
methane to power the community streets lights and water pumps.
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3.6 Robustness Checks
While the results presented in the previous section suggests that the quality
of neighborhood drains affect the incidence of water borne disease in the household,
we present checks to address some of the concerns that may arise with our empirical
strategy. Firstly, we address the concern of endogeneity of poverty and ill health
incidence as defined in our study. Second, we present alternative definitions of
drain quality, continuous measure of drain quality rather than a clean/dirty dummy.
Third, we present alternative model estimations: poisson and OLS for the original
specification. Fourth, we use a direct measure of reported open defecation rather
than percentage households without toilets.
3.6.1 IV estimation
Table 6 presents the IV poisson estimation with poverty instrumented by caste
and land dummy. Note that the first stage F statistic is well over the thumb rule of
10 (see rows at the bottom of Table 6), and exceed the Stock-Yogo critical values for
multiple instrument estimation (refer to Kleibergen-Paap F statistic). Note that the
magnitude of effect on drain clean variable increases across specifications. Also note
that when instrumenting for poverty status, the effect of college educated households
and the gender of the head of the household continues to have the expected sign
and is now significant.
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3.6.2 Alternative measure of drain quality
To reiterate, the households had to report their drain quality on a scale going
from very dirty to very clean12. We construct a new “drain dirty” dummy, if the
drains were reported very dirty or dirty. If the hypothesis that clean drains (clean,
very clean) reduce the incidence of water borne disease, then dirty drains should
increase disease incidents. Note that moderate drains were included in the reference
category in both these constructs.
The estimates on the dirty drain dummy (see Table 9) produces the corollary
effect, an increase in water borne disease incidents: the sign is opposite (as expected)
and the significance remains the same. To interpret, the incidence rate increase to
1.91 times the base rate (the group with not dirty drains). Essentially households
with dirty drains have twice the water borne disease incidents compared to other
households.
Furthermore, as an additional check, we use a continuous measure of drains
quality rather than the drain clean dummy. Yet, again the results persist.
3.6.3 Alternative estimation: Poisson, OLS
We noted in the preceding section that Poisson model is not suitable for our
data. But we present the results here for the sake of comparison with the negative
12The full scale of options available to the respondents in the survey were: very dirty; dirty;
moderate; clean; very clean
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binomial model and also as a robustness check of the results 13.
We present the OLS estimation (in Table 8), and note that the sign and
significance on our variables of interest persists.
3.6.4 Alternative measure of village level fecal load
The survey asked the households to report the members defecating in the open
within the household. We use this measure to construct the percentage members
in the sample from the villages reporting open defecation. Since this suffers from
the same issue of no within village variation and therefore not amenable to fixed
effects, we run this model (see Table 11) without fixed effects (akin to equation 17,
results in Table 3). Although we are surprised that the aggregate of reported open
defecation does not seem to be significant predictor of water borne disease at the
household level (unlike Table 3, where we found negative impact of % village toilet),
the sign and significance on the drain clean variable continues. The incidence rate
remains about the same on drain clean variable (0.30 times the reference group with
moderate or dirty drains), but it is now significant at 1% level.
13The goodness of fit test rejected the poisson model in favor, which is the reason we chose to
use the Negative Binomial Model. It can be considered as a generalization of Poisson regression
since it has the same mean structure as Poisson regression and it has an extra parameter to model
the over-dispersion. If the conditional distribution of the outcome variable is over-dispersed, the
confidence intervals for the Negative binomial regression are likely to be narrower as compared to
those from a Poisson regression model.
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3.7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we throw light on a previously unexamined channel of water
borne disease transmission, drain quality, and show evidence for the magnitude of
its impact. We find that households reporting clean drains in their neighborhood
have about one-third the incidence rate of water borne disease compared to those
reporting not clean drains.This large result persists even after controlling for a va-
riety of observable covariates, but the estimated correlation coefficients do not vary
substantially. The strong and systematic effect we treat as preliminary evidence
of the importance of improving drain quality in consonance with increasing access
to sanitation facilities given the externalities associated with neighborhood drain
quality and open defecation.
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Table 3.1: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Variables Definition
Household’s ill-Health Number of members in the family with incidence of illness in the last twelve months
Poverty Status Household is below the poverty line
Male-Headed Household Head of the Household is Male
Age of Household Head Age of the household head (in years)
Household Size Total members in the household
Caste Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe Household
No Formal Schooling No Formal Schooling of the household head
Primary School The household head has primary school education
High School The household head has high school education
College and Above The household head has atleast college education
Agriculture The primary occupation of the household is agriculture
Casual Labor The primary occupation of the household is casual labor
Services The primary occupation of the household is Services
Others The primary occupation of the household is Others
Land Ownership Household owns some amound of land
Distance to Road The distance between the household and the main road is greater than 1 km (0.62 mile)
Latrine Availability Household has a latrine in the house
Village Latrine Availability Percentage latrine availability in the village
Neighborhood Clean Drain Neighborhood drainage is clean or is in good sanitary condition
Plain The terrain of the village is plain
Swajal Program The village had the Swajal program
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Table 3.2: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Measures of ill-Health:
Household’s ill-Health 0.211 0.554
Household’s ill-Health Index 0.041 0.113
Socioeconomic Characteristics:
Poverty Status 0.578 0.494
Male Head of Household (HH) 0.951 0.216
Age of Household Head 47.003 13.842
Household Size 5.242 2.015
Caste 0.262 0.44
No Formal Schooling 0.394 0.489
Primary School 0.312 0.464
High School 0.226 0.418
College or Above 0.067 0.251
Agriculture 0.324 0.468
Casual Labor 0.263 0.441
Services 0.241 0.428
Other 0.171 0.377
Land Ownership 0.691 0.462
Distance to Road 0.322 0.467
Hygiene Behavior:
Latrine Availability 0.512 0.5
Village Latrine Availability 0.512 0.268
Neighborhood Clean Drain 0.075 0.267
Toilet Scheme 0.205 0.404
Water Source away from Latrine 0.841 0.366
Covered Drinking Water 0.895 0.306
Water Availability 0.41 0.492
Others:
Plain 0.379 0.485
Swajal Program 0.297 0.457
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Table 3.3: Negative Binomial Regression: No fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Family ill health incidents
% village toilet -1.050** -1.010* -1.023* -1.000** -1.089** -1.135**
(-2.61) (-2.47) (-2.55) (-2.59) (-2.82) (-3.02)
Neighborhood drain clean -0.633* -0.630* -0.641* -0.622* -1.115** -1.109**
(-2.44) (-2.37) (-2.40) (-2.18) (-3.06) (-2.98)
Household size 0.202** 0.199** 0.197** 0.197** 0.241** 0.236**
(4.82) (4.72) (4.63) (4.61) (5.09) (5.20)
Program village (Swajal) 0.425 0.385 0.382 0.360 0.331 0.253
(1.62) (1.45) (1.45) (1.39) (1.22) (0.83)
HH latrine available -0.556* -0.525* -0.536* -0.513* -0.545* -0.654**
(-2.35) (-2.27) (-2.34) (-2.25) (-2.26) (-3.05)
Plain dummy -0.244 -0.294 -0.314 -0.294 -0.278 -0.230
(-1.10) (-1.28) (-1.40) (-1.37) (-1.21) (-1.08)
Poor household dummy 0.408* 0.319+ 0.336* 0.292+ 0.299+ 0.265
(2.51) (1.89) (2.03) (1.83) (1.81) (1.63)
DW source away from latrine -0.944** -0.934** -0.930** -0.935** -0.948** -0.933**
(-2.79) (-2.86) (-2.86) (-2.96) (-3.23) (-3.31)
Drinking water covered -0.340+ -0.338+ -0.382* -0.356* -0.413* -0.430*
(-1.91) (-1.94) (-2.20) (-2.09) (-2.10) (-2.13)
Soap washing dummy 0.187 0.173 0.220 0.241
(0.92) (0.87) (1.06) (1.19)
Subsidy toilet 0.321
(1.22)
Observations 1530 1530 1530 1530 1431 1431
t statistics in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Other controls include occupation dummies, education, age and gender of household head
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Table 3.4: Negative Binomial Regression: Gram panchayat fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Neighborhood drain clean -0.869* -0.859* -0.867* -0.837* -1.105* -1.104*
(-2.25) (-2.28) (-2.29) (-2.28) (-2.16) (-2.16)
Household size 0.182** 0.186** 0.184** 0.184** 0.222** 0.222**
(4.34) (4.37) (4.28) (4.17) (4.67) (4.67)
HH latrine available -0.397+ -0.390+ -0.398+ -0.413* -0.436* -0.429*
(-1.85) (-1.88) (-1.91) (-1.96) (-1.97) (-2.01)
Poor household dummy 0.254+ 0.170 0.187 0.183 0.198 0.200
(1.68) (1.04) (1.15) (1.11) (1.12) (1.11)
DW source away from latrine -0.347 -0.340 -0.338 -0.363+ -0.465+ -0.464+
(-1.47) (-1.53) (-1.53) (-1.66) (-1.91) (-1.92)
Drinking water covered -0.150 -0.147 -0.172 -0.171 -0.268 -0.267
(-0.81) (-0.82) (-0.98) (-0.98) (-1.33) (-1.32)
Soap washing dummy 0.152 0.125 0.121 0.120
(0.70) (0.59) (0.53) (0.54)
Subsidy toilet -0.0213
(-0.09)
GP dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1530 1530 1530 1530 1431 1431
t statistics in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Other controls include occupation dummies, education, age and gender of household head
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Table 3.5: Interacting % HH’s w/o toilet and clean drains (neg. binomial)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Village % no latrine x Drain clean -2.126** -2.179** -2.194** -2.190** -2.172** -2.172**
(-2.95) (-2.88) (-2.89) (-2.98) (-2.70) (-2.69)
Household size 0.186** 0.190** 0.188** 0.187** 0.222** 0.222**
(4.46) (4.48) (4.40) (4.27) (4.66) (4.66)
HH latrine available -0.415+ -0.407+ -0.415+ -0.429* -0.451* -0.445*
(-1.89) (-1.92) (-1.95) (-2.00) (-2.02) (-2.07)
Plain dummy -2.570** -2.501** -0.362* -0.347* -2.213** -2.223**
(-10.68) (-10.85) (-2.42) (-2.42) (-7.38) (-6.90)
Poor household dummy 0.255+ 0.171 0.188 0.184 0.197 0.198
(1.74) (1.07) (1.19) (1.14) (1.13) (1.12)
DW source away from latrine Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Drinking water covered Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Soap washing dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subsidy toilet Yes
GP dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1530 1530 1530 1530 1431 1431
t statistics in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Other controls include occupation dummies, education, age and gender of household head
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Table 3.6: Poverty endogenous: Instrumental Variables Poisson model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Neighborhood drain clean -1.829** -1.259* -1.409* -1.276+ -1.792* -1.846*
(-2.58) (-1.99) (-2.11) (-1.77) (-2.21) (-2.24)
Household size 0.386** 0.400** 0.399** 0.451** 0.497** 0.522**
(5.19) (6.25) (6.18) (6.27) (6.16) (5.83)
HH latrine available -0.241 -0.362 -0.345 -0.529+ -0.715* -0.834*
(-0.78) (-1.19) (-1.14) (-1.72) (-2.27) (-2.27)
Poor household dummy 1.592* 0.343 0.504 0.182 0.246 0.233
(2.04) (0.42) (0.61) (0.21) (0.28) (0.27)
GP dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1530 1530 1530 1530 1431 1431
First stage F statistic 56.24 36.50 29.95 26.54 26.48 26.20
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic 118.93 77.34 63.52 56.40 56.49 55.92
t statistics in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 10% maximal IV size: 19.93; 15%:11.59; 20% 8.75
Other controls included
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Table 3.7: Alternative model specification: Poisson with fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Neighborhood drain clean -1.829** -1.259* -1.409* -1.276+ -1.792* -1.846*
(-2.58) (-1.99) (-2.11) (-1.77) (-2.21) (-2.24)
Household size 0.386** 0.400** 0.399** 0.451** 0.497** 0.522**
(5.19) (6.25) (6.18) (6.27) (6.16) (5.83)
HH latrine available -0.241 -0.362 -0.345 -0.529+ -0.715* -0.834*
(-0.78) (-1.19) (-1.14) (-1.72) (-2.27) (-2.27)
Poor household dummy 1.592* 0.343 0.504 0.182 0.246 0.233
(2.04) (0.42) (0.61) (0.21) (0.28) (0.27)
DW source away from latrine -0.557 -0.764* -0.726* -0.757* -1.168** -1.177**
(-1.53) (-2.19) (-2.08) (-2.19) (-3.03) (-3.05)
Drinking water covered -0.255 -0.208 -0.287 -0.155 -0.413 -0.445
(-0.89) (-0.81) (-1.09) (-0.56) (-1.38) (-1.46)
Soap washing dummy 0.325 0.122 -0.0306 -0.0462
(1.17) (0.42) (-0.08) (-0.13)
Subsidy toilet 0.268
(0.55)
GP dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1530 1530 1530 1530 1431 1431
t statistics in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Other controls include occupation dummies, education, age and gender of household head
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Table 3.8: Alternative model specification: OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Neighborhood drain clean -0.229+ -0.226+ -0.227+ -0.225+ -0.247+ -0.248+
(-1.69) (-1.69) (-1.69) (-1.73) (-1.84) (-1.83)
Household size 0.0453** 0.0461** 0.0457** 0.0448** 0.0520** 0.0519**
(3.65) (3.65) (3.62) (3.54) (3.55) (3.55)
HH latrine available -0.115+ -0.110+ -0.114+ -0.117+ -0.118+ -0.126+
(-1.80) (-1.74) (-1.72) (-1.75) (-1.69) (-1.92)
Poor household dummy 0.0497 0.0285 0.0327 0.0343 0.0374 0.0360
(1.60) (0.82) (0.93) (0.96) (0.94) (0.88)
DW source away from latrine -0.0574 -0.0573 -0.0561 -0.0635 -0.0748 -0.0757
(-0.95) (-0.98) (-0.97) (-1.08) (-1.22) (-1.24)
Drinking water covered -0.0379 -0.0332 -0.0403 -0.0441 -0.0634 -0.0644
(-0.66) (-0.57) (-0.71) (-0.77) (-0.92) (-0.93)
Soap washing dummy 0.0415 0.0372 0.0454 0.0462
(0.74) (0.67) (0.75) (0.78)
Subsidy toilet 0.0227
(0.33)
Observations 1530 1530 1530 1530 1431 1431
t statistics in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Other controls include occupation dummies, education, age and gender of household head
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Table 3.9: Model with drain dirty (base: moderate, clean, very clean)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Neighborhood drain dirty 0.356+ 0.353* 0.367* 0.384* 0.388* 0.388*
(1.92) (1.96) (2.04) (2.17) (2.10) (2.09)
Household size 0.180** 0.184** 0.182** 0.180** 0.214** 0.214**
(4.36) (4.39) (4.30) (4.16) (4.53) (4.53)
HH latrine available -0.419+ -0.411+ -0.420* -0.434* -0.459* -0.451*
(-1.90) (-1.93) (-1.97) (-2.02) (-2.07) (-2.12)
Poor household dummy 0.221 0.141 0.159 0.154 0.163 0.165
(1.52) (0.89) (1.01) (0.96) (0.94) (0.93)
DW source away from latrine Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Drinking water covered Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Soap washing dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subsidy toilet Yes
GP dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1530 1530 1530 1530 1431 1431
t statistics in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Other controls include occupation dummies, education, age and gender of household head
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Table 3.10: Model with drain quality (1- Very dirty to 5 Very clean)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Family ill health incidents
Neighborhood drain quality -0.218* -0.225* -0.226* -0.225* -0.280* -0.281*
(range 1 - 5) (-2.02) (-2.09) (-2.09) (-2.08) (-2.47) (-2.46)
Household size 0.165** 0.169** 0.168** 0.165** 0.195** 0.193**
(3.88) (3.93) (3.86) (3.73) (4.13) (4.15)
Program village (Swajal) -2.038** 2.002** 2.008** 1.975** -2.002** -2.054**
(-12.35) (5.79) (5.81) (5.32) (-10.93) (-10.30)
HH latrine available -0.318 -0.313+ -0.318+ -0.327+ -0.343+ -0.395+
(-1.60) (-1.69) (-1.70) (-1.78) (-1.82) (-1.85)
Plain dummy -3.137** -3.262** -3.257** -3.146** -2.985** -2.929**
(-9.01) (-10.20) (-10.05) (-9.21) (-8.11) (-8.11)
Poor household dummy 0.225 0.155 0.162 0.151 0.175 0.164
(1.40) (0.89) (0.93) (0.87) (0.93) (0.87)
DW source away from latrine -0.357 -0.347 -0.346 -0.370 -0.457+ -0.462+
(-1.36) (-1.43) (-1.43) (-1.55) (-1.74) (-1.78)
Drinking water covered -0.174 -0.175 -0.186 -0.184 -0.297 -0.305
(-0.95) (-1.00) (-1.09) (-1.08) (-1.47) (-1.50)
Soap washing dummy 0.0609 0.0345 0.00441 0.0120
(0.29) (0.17) (0.02) (0.05)
Subsidy toilet 0.169
(0.87)
GP dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1440 1440 1440 1440 1343 1343
t statistics in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Other controls include occupation dummies, education, age and gender of household head
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Table 3.11: Percentage village members reporting open defecation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Family ill health incidents
Percentage village open defecation -0.0530 -0.159 -0.123 -0.104 -0.594 -0.565
(-0.08) (-0.22) (-0.17) (-0.15) (-1.03) (-1.03)
Neighborhood drain clean -0.697** -0.691** -0.701** -0.680* -1.176** -1.172**
(-2.90) (-2.79) (-2.82) (-2.53) (-3.35) (-3.27)
Household size 0.203** 0.200** 0.198** 0.198** 0.242** 0.238**
(4.79) (4.71) (4.62) (4.60) (5.19) (5.33)
Program village (Swajal) 0.209 0.171 0.167 0.148 0.0857 0.0181
(0.76) (0.62) (0.61) (0.55) (0.32) (0.06)
HH latrine available -0.769** -0.730** -0.740** -0.707** -0.765** -0.856**
(-3.21) (-3.05) (-3.10) (-2.95) (-2.97) (-3.79)
Plain dummy -0.288 -0.325 -0.348 -0.333 -0.243 -0.213
(-1.01) (-1.15) (-1.25) (-1.24) (-0.93) (-0.86)
Poor household dummy 0.402* 0.301+ 0.316+ 0.269 0.261 0.235
(2.31) (1.67) (1.78) (1.59) (1.49) (1.37)
DW source away from latrine -0.790* -0.784* -0.780* -0.789** -0.787** -0.772**
(-2.43) (-2.50) (-2.51) (-2.62) (-2.79) (-2.81)
Drinking water covered -0.371* -0.371* -0.407* -0.379* -0.452* -0.464*
(-1.97) (-2.01) (-2.26) (-2.16) (-2.20) (-2.22)
Soap washing dummy 0.159 0.145 0.196 0.212
(0.76) (0.71) (0.96) (1.08)
Subsidy toilet 0.251
(0.95)
Observations 1530 1530 1530 1530 1431 1431
t statistics in parentheses, + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
Other controls include occupation dummies, education, age and gender of household head
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